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The emergence of the field of behavioral economics has provided critical insights into the way 
people behave when confronted with decisions. Traditionally, economic models predict behavior 
that is economically rational, but behavioral economics has shown how people are often 
irrational in predictable ways because they are being affected by different biases and heuristics. 
For policymakers, these insights can show ways in which governments can change their behavior 
to take advantage of people’s humanity. This paper will show the value of taking these insights 
to the local level, as local governments provide a number of valuable services and account for 
the most direct and frequent interaction between citizens and their government. Specifically, this 
paper will look at the area of public housing in the United States. Public housing has gained a 
rather notorious reputation in the United States, as government policy and socioeconomic trends 
have caused public housing to house only the poorest of the poor. Still, public housing accounts 
for around 1.1 million households across America, and could benefit greatly from behavioral 
economic approaches to policy. This paper will look at the problems occurring in public housing, 
match these up to the behavioral “irrationalities” occurring in public housing, before finally 
providing a series of behavioral interventions which take advantage of these irrationalities to 
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CHAPTER 1:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
 The field of economics has always been about the study of human behavior and 
interaction within an economy. Chiefly, economics is concerned with how good and services are 
produced and consumed in a world where scarcity is innate to existence. Analyzing and 
predicting human behavior through models of said behavior is the backbone of economics.  
Economic discussion often gets magnified to the firm, national, and even global level, making 
economic concepts often abstract and larger than life, but it is key to remember that, when boiled 
down, the basis of all these interactions is individuals and groups of individuals, modeled as 
rational actors. Since the late 19th century, the dominant neo-classical approach to economics 
makes the simplifying assumption of treating people as mostly rational, self-interested, 
maximizing actors (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).1 The name “Homo economicus,” a 
play on the binominal nomenclature for humans (Homo sapiens) is used to characterize this 
rational self-interested actor. The usage of a completely distinct nomenclature to describe this 
kind of mythical human is telling in how divergent this kind of human is from actual members of 
the human species. Homo economicus is perfectly calculating, unemotional, and always 
maximizing for personal gain.2  
In short, people are not the mythical homo-economicus (sometimes called “economic 
man”) whose behavior is described in economic theory. This has always been known in a sense, 
but individual irrationality was either thought to be too small or too insignificant to make a 
                                                 
1 “Rational” here meaning wholly acting in a way that the individual will attempt to maximize. This is in line with 
rational choice theory which was outlined in Gary Becker’s 1976 book The Economic Approach to Human 
Behavior. For a full glossary of terms like this see Appendix A. 
2 Mullainathan, Sendhil, and Richard H. Thaler. Behavioral economics. No. w7948. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2000. 2-3. 
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difference in the behavior of a person within the model. Still, advocates of what is called a 
“behavioral” approach to economic study have sought to incorporate behavioral insights into 
new and existing economics models by understanding the biases and heuristic shortcuts that the 
human mind has empirically been shown to be vulnerable to. This approach is not without its 
critics, but now the field of “behavioral economics,” or the use of psychological, emotional, 
and/or social insights to better understand models of economic decision-making, has become a 
large, albeit developing, wing of economics.3 Already many Nobel Prizes have been handed out 
to behavioral economists and those who have incorporated realistic human behaviors into their 
theories including Richard Thaler (2017), Robert Shiller (2013), Daniel Kahneman (2002), Gary 
Becker (1992), and Herbert Simon (1978).4 Governments have also taken notice of the field, and 
many have begun the incorporation of behavioral “units” into governments to apply existing 
research to modify policy in light of behavioral insights. The field is far from an understanding 
of all the effects of human behavior on economic outcomes, but coupled with advances in 
understanding of the human brain and cognition, behavioral economics can take Keynes’ 
“animal spirits” and make them understandable.5 
 Economics is often called the “queen of the social sciences” due to its widely accepted 
use in society and its ability to “crowd out,” in a way, the other social sciences. In behavioral 
economics, the queen’s domineering effect is on full display. Although behavioral economics is 
really more psychology than economics, economists have co-opted the field. Perhaps this veil of 
superiority is part of the reason why economist were so reluctant to accept insights from 
                                                 
3 Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds. Advances in behavioral economics. Princeton 
University Press, 2011. 3-51.  
4 Nobel Media AB. "Nobel Prizes and Laureates." Nobelprize.org. Accessed November 10, 2017. 
5 Wasik, John. "4 Ways Nobel Prize Winner Richard Thaler's Work Has Improved Your Life." Forbes. Last  
     modified October 9, 2017. 
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disciples of the queen’s sister, psychology. The beginning of behavioral economics as a field 
came in the 1970s as psychologists began applying relatively recent psychological advances to 
economic models in ways that modified the pure rational actor theory. Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, two Israeli psychologists, published a large number of papers which showed how 
people behaved in irrational ways when making decisions. Their first and arguably most 
important paper was on “Prospect Theory” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), in which the pair 
showed that a person’s willingness to take risk is context dependent and results will change 
based on seemingly superficial things like the framing of the problem.6 For example, Kahneman 
& Tversky would pose the following question to people: 
1. Which of the following would you prefer: 
 
A) A certain win of $250, versus  
 
B) A 25% chance to win $1000 and a 75% chance to win nothing? 
 
2. How about:  
C) A certain loss of $750, versus  
D) A 75% chance to lose $1000 and a 25% chance to lose nothing? 
                                                 
6 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk." In Handbook of The 
Fundamentals of Financial Decision Making: Part I, pp. 99-127. 2013. 
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In the first question, a gain, most will choose A) and opt for a riskless $250 versus a risky 
weighted probability of $250 in B). Inconsistently, in the second question, which is framed as a 
loss, people overwhelmingly were more likely to choose D). This is because people are more 
sensitive to losses than they are to equivalent gains (see figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1 Prospect Theory Visualized7 
Later additional research would bring increased insight into the other ways in which people are 
seemingly inconsistent and irrational. Take for example the conjunction fallacy (popularly 
known as the “Linda problem”), which emerges from the representativeness heuristic, which 
states that certain characteristics are given outweighed consideration that is out of line with said 
characteristic’s probability and which makes observers violate fundamental mathematical logic.8  
 
 
                                                 
7 Author/Copyright holder: JohnKiat. Copyright terms and licence: CC BY-SA 3.0 
8 Leonard, Thomas C. "Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and 
happiness." Constitutional Political Economy 19, no. 4 (2008): 356-360. 
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For example, subjects were asked the following:  
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Which is more probable? 
1. Linda is a bank teller. 
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in a feminist movement. 
 
The majority of subjects will choose 1., even though the probability of two events concurrently 
occurring is always less than or equal to the probability of just one event occurring (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1983).9 The fact that Linda is active in a feminist movement may seem relevant, but 
really it is just a distracting piece of information here. The kind of framing of the problem will 
entirely throw off respondents otherwise correct answers.  
The University of Chicago’s Richard Thaler was also one of the first contribute to 
behavioral economics. He was the first one to pioneer using intentional behavioral 
interventions—or “nudges”— in order to direct people to make decisions in their own interest. 
Thaler met up with psychologists Kahneman and Tversky while they were at Stanford in 1977-
1978 to collaborate with them. He had heard about their work on decision-making and had been 
attempting to bring behavioral irrationalities into the field of economics itself.10 Through these 
collaborations Thaler produced a paper on “mental accounting,” the arbitrary labeling of liquid 
similar money into separate accounts based on factors like anticipated usage or source of income 
(Thaler, 1985), and something he called the “endowment effect,” an effect which causes people 
                                                 
9 Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in 
probability judgment." Psychological review 90, no. 4 (1983): 293. 
10 For more information on the background of behavioral economics see: Samson, Alain. "The behavioral economics 
guide 2014." (2014). 
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to overestimate the value of items they own merely because they are in possession of it 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).11 
Before beginning discussion in this paper, it is important to note that falling victim to 
heuristics and biases does not point out a particular defect in an individual, for everyone 
regardless of education or background is liable to fall into the traps outlined by behavioral 
economics because all humans use cognitive shortcuts to deal with information overload 
throughout the day (Samson, 2015).12 Behavior economics taps into the fact that, although 
humans are capable of great intellectual feats, in daily life people are overexposed to information 
and thus must rely on a number of heuristics and biases to get by. Based on an understanding of 
people’s behavioral quirks, certain subtle things can be changed or put in place in order to try to 
direct behavior in another direction which will yield more positive results for the individual 
and/or society. These are what this paper will refer as “behavioral interventions.” 
This paper will discuss the application of behavioral interventions in local government, 
specifically looking at the area of public housing. The knowledge of behavioral economics can 
be leveraged through behavioral interventions to improve government’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. This, in turn, can produce better outcomes and cost savings for local governments 
in a variety of policy domains. This paper’s focus on public housing is meant to shed light on 
one of those domains which is as of yet relatively unexamined. New interventions will be 
proposed, and conclusions will be drawn about the use of behavioral economics to combat the 
problems seen in public housing. 
                                                 
11 Thaler, Richard. "Mental accounting and consumer choice." Marketing science 4, no. 3 (1985): 199-214. And 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. "Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and 
status quo bias." The journal of economic perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 193-206. 
12 Samson, Alain. "The behavioral economics guide 2015 (with an introduction by Dan Ariely)." (2015). 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE PROMISE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONS  
Behavioral economics has many elements that can lend it broad appeal across the 
political spectrum. It starts with the seemingly uncontroversial and research-backed premise that 
humans are susceptible to irrationality and that one’s environment can impact behavior and 
decisions. From there, behavioral economics takes the next logical step and asserts that, by 
correcting for these lapses in human judgement, value can be created (Samson, 2017).13 If 
government utilizes these insights in the same way other group such as marketing departments 
and the private sector have, the result is service improvement and/or cost savings at little to no 
expense. Behavioral economics is the low-hanging fruit of government policy which remains 
ripe in America even in today’s hyper-partisan political climate. Indeed, the Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force included using behavioral economics to reduce the number 
of individuals claiming retirement benefits at an early age in its plan to strength Social 
Security.14 Additionally, in 2014 the US Senate unanimously passed the American Savings 
Promotion Act (HR 3374), which allowed the offering of prize-linked-savings accounts, a 
savings incentive approach which incorporates behavioral economics strategies.15 Finally, the 
independent former New York City mayor and entrepreneur Michael Bloomberg has sponsored 
the What Works Cities initiative to use evidence-based strategies, notably many behavioral 
economic ones pioneered in the UK, to improve the efficiency of America’s 100 largest cities.16 
 
                                                 
13 Samson, Alain. "The behavioral economics guide 2017 (with an introduction by Cass Sunstein)." (2017). 
14 Akabas, Shai. "Social Security, Behavioral Economics, and the Power of Language." Bipartisan Policy Center, 
August 4, 2011. 
15 Butler, Stuart M. "Prizes for Savings: A Bipartisan Success in Congress." Brookings, December 18, 2014. 
16 Bloomberg Philanthropies. "About Us." What Works Cities. 
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The Pragmatic Approach to Using Behavioral Economics 
From an academic perspective, the debate between behavioral economics and 
neoclassical economics is of interest, but from a policy perspective, it is not necessary to declare 
a “winner” before any useful public policy benefits can be had. Moreover, as Raj Chetty, 
Stanford economist and John Bates Clark Medal recipient, writes, “Incorporating behavioral 
features to the extent they help answer core economic questions may be more productive than 
viewing behavioral economics as a separate subfield that challenges the assumptions of 
neoclassical models.”17 Chetty stresses a pragmatic approach in applying behavioral economics 
to government services. The focus of the pragmatic approach, he says, should be not about 
whether individuals are fundamentally rational or about whether neoclassical models remains 
valid, it should start with the policy questions. For examples, “how can we increase savings 
rates” or “how can we reduce crime.” Behavioral methods will then be included only so much as 
it is shown to increase the solutions to these problems. Proceeding with this approach in mind, 
the focus of this paper will be in finding applications that will, if implemented, improve lives. 
For immediate, micro-level policy considerations, the larger debate about behavioral economics 
is fairly irrelevant. 
 Even framing the conflict between these two sides as a debate is somewhat misleading. 
Behavioral economics in its current form does not propose any kind of stand-alone unified 
theory; instead, behavioral economics is merely a selective critique of existing neoclassical 
theory. There is not a real consistent underlying theory of behavioral economics, aside from a 
general notion that people behave irrationally in certain systemic, psychologically determined 
                                                 
17 Chetty, Raj. "Behavioral economics and public policy: A pragmatic perspective." The American Economic Review 
105, no. 5 (2015): 1-33. 
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ways. The “field” of behavioral economics is just a collection of semi-related behavioral 
tendencies that have been observed in humans.18 Nevertheless, knowing these behavioral 
tendencies is valuable, and it is unproductive to frame behavioral economics as in conflict with 
the rest of economic theory. For now, behavioral economics is a series of exceptions to larger 
rules about people’s economic behavior. Exceptions do not have to debunk a rule to be valid in 
their own right.    
Current Policy Applications 
Already behavioral economics has had a policy impact. Countries, particularly at the 
federal and national level, have attempted to incorporate behavioral economics into 
policymaking in order to improve government services or to save money. Perhaps most 
prominent among these is the United Kingdom, which in 2010 established the Behavioral 
Insights Team (BIT), also known as the “Nudge Unit.” BIT is the first governmental institution 
formed dedicated to behavioral science applications. While BIT began in 10 Downing Street, it 
soon turned into a social entrepreneurship, co-run by the British government and the British 
charity Nesta (National Endowment for Science, Technology, and the Arts).19 The group puts out 
original research, policy briefs, and case studies of applications. BIT will be a consistent 
reference point in this paper, as it has confirmed the efficacy of applying behavioral economics 
and local and regional levels to produce social good.  
In the United States, President Barack Obama created the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Team (SBST) through Executive Order 13707 (“Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better 
                                                 
18 Chowdhury, Masihul Huq. "Redefining Economic Theories?" The Independent, October  
     17, 2017. 
19 Behavioral Insights Team. "About Us." Nesta. 
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Serve the American People”), signed in September of 2015.20 SBST was a group of researchers 
who sought to apply behavioral insights, where possible, to federal programs. The effort was 
short-lived, as with the entry of the Trump administration in January of 2017, the team was 
dissolved.  Unfortunately, the team did not have the reach of its British counterpart, BIT, but it 
still showed the possibility in the United States, of being able to incorporate behavioral 
economics at the federal level. SBST’s work focused on increase national retirement savings and 
investment, increasing healthcare access, conserving energy, and even orchestrating policy 
responses to the Flint, Michigan lead-contamination crisis. Fortunately, there are scores, if not 
hundreds of other groups working on behavioral economics in the United States including 
universities, state and local governments, consultancies, banks, non-profits, and think-tanks.21  
The US and UK are not alone in adopting behavioral economics when possible. Already 
BIT is expanding its presence into foreign nations such as Australia and the US, and national 
governments, in countries such as Germany and Japan, and international associations such as the 
World Bank and United Nations, are creating their own teams.22 
Overview of Existing Biases and Heuristics (Behavioral Principles) 
 In a perfect world, if individuals were all Homo economicus, our decisions would be 
based on absolutely rational choice that carefully weighs the costs and benefits of all decisions 
based on their alignment with fixed personal preference. Of course, this is not the case. People 
are not always acting in their own self-interest: purchase decisions are driven, in part, by factors 
such as mood and environment as opposed to pure cost and benefit, we overweigh the 
                                                 
20 Exec. Order No. 13707, 3 C.F.R. (2015). 
21 Supra, Note 13. 
22 "Nudge Nudge, Think Think." The Economist, March 24, 2012. 
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importance of the present and neglect to plan for the future, the list continues to go on and on. 
Again, there is no real unifying theory of behavioral economics. Our irrationalities are, by their 
very nature of being irrational, hard to describe in one fatal swoop without a more complex 
understanding of all the intricacies of the human brain, but various models have arisen to try to 
explain the process by which actual human choice works. This provides at least a conceptual 
framework through which individual irrationalities can be empirically investigated. 
 One of the first concepts of modeling human divergence from rationality is the notion of 
“bounded rationality”, which describes how economic evidence shows that humans have 
restricted rationality (Simon, 1955).23 The author, Herbert Simon, describes the gap between 
what an optimizer would do and what a realistic individual would do. This gap emerges for 
several reasons. Critically, all humans have cognitive limitations. At the same time, economics 
problems can be quite difficult to grasp and understand in an open-ended world, as rather than 
being presented merely with a choice-set, individuals choose from a theoretically unlimited set of 
options. Simon found other limiting factor. For instance, people have limitations on the amount 
of knowledge that can be processed and information that can be stored (Simon, 1982).24 Because 
of this, humans have limitations on their ability to be rational. Instead of yielding optimal 
choices, individuals produce satisfactory results, a term Simon called “satisficing”. 
Unfortunately, in Simon’s world as in ours, psychologists have yet to unlock a full understanding 
of the human mind, forcing the imperfect assumption of rationality to have to dominate as the 
guiding light for economic behavior.25  
                                                 
23 Simon, Herbert A. "A behavioral model of rational choice." The quarterly journal of economics 69, no. 1 (1955): 
99-118. 
24 Simon, Herbert Alexander. Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded economic reason. Vol. 3. MIT 
press, 1982. 
25 Van der Linden, Sander. "A response to Dolan." AJ Oliver (Ed.), Behavioural Public Policy (pp. 209-215) (2013). 
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Another important way to think about human behavior is that of “dual-system theory” 
which was best described by Kahneman’s “System 1 and System 2” theory made by building 
upon prior work of Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman 1996; and Stanovich 1999.26 Kahneman 
explains how the same people can be at once extremely analytical and thoughtful while also 
being prone to misjudgments and biases.27 This is because humans are thought to have two types 
of cognitive systems: System 1, consists of processes that are “intuitive, automatic, experience-
based, and relatively unconscious” that are rooted in impression; System 2 consists of processes 
that are more “reflective, controlled, deliberate, and analytical” which attempt to oversee and 
check mental operations.28 
Before Kahneman and Tversky, the incorporation of known behavioral irrationalities was 
inexact, which led Kahneman and Tversky to develop a different methodological approach when 
researching human cognition. The Israeli psychologists proceed with their research through a 
case study-like system of experimental design which could test theories of divergence from 
rationality by looking at the economic decision-making of people placed under certain 
experimental conditions.29 The successive development of many of these individual experimental 
design set ups allowed for the discovery of a whole series of biases and nudges that impact 
human decision-making. An understanding of these behavioral quirks collectively make-up the 
basis for behavioral economics. Although there are many of these “behavioral principles”, below 
this paper will discuss some of the most notable and important. These are important to 
                                                 
26 Evans, Jonathan St BT, and David E. Over. "Rationality in the selection task: Epistemic utility versus uncertainty 
reduction." (1996): 356.; Sloman, Steven A. "The empirical case for two systems of 
reasoning." Psychological bulletin 119, no. 1 (1996): 3.; and Stanovich, Keith E. Who is rational?: Studies 
of individual differences in reasoning. Psychology Press, 1999. 
27 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan, 2011. 
28 Supra., Note 10. 
29 Ibid.,   
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understand for the forthcoming conversation about policy applications because these behavioral 
principles are constantly affecting rational judgement. Unfortunately, the behavioral economic 
literature is too vast, complex, and dynamic for a comprehensive evaluation of all known 
behavioral principles, so it will be sufficient to first look at the most prominent general 
principles, and then look at what the most dominant “behavioral interventions,” being used to 
counter them are:  
Availability and Representativeness Heuristic 
 People are prone to make judgements with the information they have. Since that 
information is often incomplete people have to try to fill those gaps of knowledge with what they 
do know (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).30 This is called the “availability” heuristic. Judgements 
about the likelihood of events then are often made based on the ease with which an example 
comes to mind, meaning that more prominent examples will stake outsized claim in our minds. 
For example, the fear of certain things consistently overestimates the risk of said thing: airlines 
disasters, shark attacks, terrorism, etc.31 Other causes of death, such as through heart disease or 
traffic accident are far underestimated in their likelihood.32 This not only causes unnecessary 
public hysteria over certain things, it also causes a misallocation of preventative money towards 
dangers that come more easily to mind, leading to the neglect of other dangers which are 
probabilistically dominant. This can come about in smaller, more deeply ingrained ways. 
Researchers have shown that individuals who are more likely to recall anti-depressant 
advertisements are more likely to weight depression as a greater problem (An, 2008), and 
                                                 
30 Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases." science 185, no. 
4157 (1974): 1124-1131. 




customers use the number of low-price products they can recall, rather than overall prices paid at 
a store, when judging that store’s overall price level (Ofir, Raghubir, Brosh, Monroe, & Heiman, 
2008).33  
There are a couple of additional heuristics related to availability that are worth 
mentioning. First is “representativeness,” the idea that certain characteristics weigh heavier in 
our mind than others due to prominence, so we develop an unrealistic understanding of reality  
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).34 The “Linda problem” mentioned in the introduction is a clear 
example of this. Additionally, the “affect” heuristic, is a reliance on immediate good or bad 
feelings had in response to something as a basis for wider judgement (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
& MacGregor, 2002).35 For example, people develop negative attitudes about certain things, and 
when they have limited time to make decisions, people are likely to fall back on these biases in 
decision-making, rather than focusing on a more analytical approach (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).36 Finucane et al. give the example of people underestimating the 
benefits of nuclear power and overestimating the harms. 
Inertia and Status Quo Bias 
 People have a heavy preference for the present, even when only small sacrifices or 
transaction costs are necessary to switch to a more optimal alternative (Samuelson & 
                                                 
33 An, Soontae. "Antidepressant direct-to-consumer advertising and social perception of the prevalence of 
depression: Application of the availability heuristic." Health communication 23, no. 6 (2008): 499-505. and Ofir, 
Chezy, Priya Raghubir, Gili Brosh, Kent B. Monroe, and Amir Heiman. "Memory-based store price judgments: the 
role of knowledge and shopping experience." Journal of Retailing 84, no. 4 (2008): 414-423. 
34 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness." Cognitive 
psychology 3, no. 3 (1972): 430-454. 
35 Gilovich, Thomas, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds. Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive 
judgment. Cambridge university press, 2002.397-420 
36 Finucane, Melissa L., Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic, and Stephen M. Johnson. "The affect heuristic in judgments of 
risks and benefits." Journal of behavioral decision making 13, no. 1 (2000): 1. 
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Zeckhauser, 1988). 37 Samuelson and Zeckhauser show this in an example with retirement plans 
in which old employees were reluctant to sign up for a new plan, despite the plan having more 
favorable rates and outcomes. New employees overwhelming chose the new plan, yet old 
employees were still reluctant to switch. This bias is part of the reason ineffective laws and 
systems often remain in place even when viable alternatives become known and available. 
Additionally, Kahneman & Tversky (1982) show that, consistent with this effect, people feel 
more regret in making choices which result in bad outcomes than they do in remaining inactive 
and getting an equally bad outcome.38 This effect can also be seen in the well-known “sunk-cost 
fallacy”, in which people are inclined to remain attached to previously made bad investments 
even when sticking with those investments, despite knowing these spent funds cannot be 
recouped, results in a worse outcome than could have been had from switching away from said 
investments (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).39 People feel mentally “tied” in this way to sunk costs.  
Present/Discounting Bias 
 People overweight the utility they get out of the present (Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O’Donoghue, 2002), and there is generally an inclination for immediate gratification. Present 
costs are immediately felt, unlike future costs.40 This is one of the most obvious behavioral 
insights, but it is almost of one of the most impactful. Neglect for the future is the cause of many 
problems including a lack of retirement savings, improper preparation for employment, and most 
                                                 
37 Samuelson, William, and Richard Zeckhauser. "Status quo bias in decision making." Journal of risk and 
uncertainty 1, no. 1 (1988): 7-59. 
38 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Variants of uncertainty." Cognition 11, no. 2 (1982): 143-157. 
39 Arkes, Hal R., and Catherine Blumer. "The psychology of sunk cost." Organizational behavior and human 
decision processes 35, no. 1 (1985): 124-140. 
40 Malhotra, Deepak, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'donoghue. "Time discounting and time preference: A critical 
review." Journal of economic literature 40, no. 2 (2002): 351-401 
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other forms of short-term thinking. Combining this with over-optimism in the future and in our 
own future behavior increases the impact of this bias.   
Over-Optimism 
 Despite an embedded conservatism elsewhere in effects like people’s inclination to be 
loss-adverse, people are consistently shown to overestimate the probability of positive events and 
underestimate the probability of negative events. Even with correct probability assumptions, 
future planning is often based on optimistic outcomes or even average outcomes, when below-
average outcomes are intractably just short of 50% of all possible outcomes. Part of the cause of 
this is likely from people having more perceived control over life factors than is actually had, 
and part may also come from the same cognitive factors outlined in representativeness 
(Shepperd, Carroll, Grace & Terry, 2002).41 
Loss aversion 
 An important part of prospect theory is loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).42 Put 
simply, “losses loom larger than gains.” This bias feeds into a number of different other 
cognitive factors such as the endowment effect, sunk cost fallacy, and status quo bias. This is not 
a trivial effect. The pain of losing is thought to be potentially twice as potent as the gains from 
winning.43 Fryer at el. 2012 showed the downside of negative behavior is more impactful than 
framing the upside of stopping negative or even preventing behavior. Take, as an example, a 
study that looked at the structure of teacher bonus pay. The study found it is more motivating to 
face the threat of losing a bonus than it is to be presented with the opportunity to gain a bonus. A 
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group of teachers who received a bonus first that would need to be returned upon not meeting 
certain test scores, performed better than those merely presented with the prospects of gaining a 
bonus for reaching similar test score levels.44 
Social Dimensions 
 Human actions are often shaped by the actions of those around us. Appropriate social 
norms can change drastically from one environment to the next due to the both conscious and 
subconscious social signaling that communicates what the rules and expectations of a group are 
(Ariely, 2008).45 Social norms can give feedback to an individual based on how “approved of” 
something is (i.e., is this action viewed favorably or unfavorably by a group), and/or it can give 
feedback as to how in-line with majority behavior an action is (separate from how that action is 
judged).  
Few people are motivated by self-interest alone, and concern for others is shown even in 
anonymous experiments (Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato, 2008).46 In some ways the rational 
actor model can explain social cooperation on the basis of the need for economic cooperation 
and charitable giving as a way to earn reputational advantages, but people exhibit a tendency 
toward unselfish behavior that goes beyond just the personal benefits reaped (Camerer, 2003).47 
Overall evidence shows people exhibit a generally high amount of trust and inclination toward 
fairness (Evans & Kruegar 2009).48  
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Overview of Common Behavioral Interventions (“Nudges”) 
Rational-Actor Tools Versus Behavioral Tools 
The rational agent model posits that individuals and organizations, are driven by self-
interest to make choices based on all available information. In this model, the main tools for 
achieving objectives are information, incentives, and regulation. Information as a tool involves 
exposing people to new facts and ideas, under the assumption that having enough accurate 
information will lead to a maximizing decision being made. Incentives as a tool involves 
providing reward or punishment, financial or otherwise, to motivate certain behaviors from 
people. Regulation as a tool involves mandating or prohibiting certain behavior through force of 
law which provides punishment for non-compliance.49 These tools are used by governments to 
bring the interests of individuals and organizations into line with society’s goals. 
It is important to understand that not all market failures are behavioral failures in the 
sense of people failing to behave rationally. For examples, not having information about 
something or not having the right incentives to do something are not behavioral failures, even 
though behaviors may be impacted. A smoker, for example, who sincerely does not know about 
the health hazards smoking causes is not acting in violation of his own best interests, he is 
merely informationally deprived. Thus, warning labels on packs of cigarettes would not be 
considered a behavioral strategy, but graphic warning labels showing blackened organs or lung 
cancer victims, could be. The latter is not trying to provide any new information, it is trying to do 
something in addition to information by trying to counter behaviors of the individual that go 
against his own our best interest. The same thing can be seen with incentive strategies. 
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Individuals who do not recycle, do so because they have no individual incentive to do so. This 
kind of behavior hurts society at-large, but it is not in violation of the rational actor model. As 
rational actors, individuals are purely self-interested, and because of this they have no individual 
incentive to recycle, and society at-large suffers. This is a case of negative externalities and 
market failure, but not behavioral failure. A rational-actor-minded change of incentives might 
pay individuals or companies for recycling; while a behavioral change might label the trashcan 
with a sticker reading “to landfill” to encourage people to throw their recyclables in a nearby bin. 
According to the rational actor model, the latter should have no effect, yet when students at the 
University of Pittsburg tried this they were able to increase recycling by 29%.50 It is not new 
information that this trash’s contents are probably going to a landfill, yet by changing the 
framing of the trash-can waste to “landfill” waste, individuals relate their action to their disgust 
of landfills and as a result changed their behavior. This is perhaps an outwardly trivial example, 
but it conveys well the way behavioral tools seek to make change. It also conveys the difference 
between a behavior change using rational-actor assumptions and behavior change using insights 
from behavioral economics. As in the landfill example given, behavioral insights are not just 
useful in better tailoring traditional economic tools. They can also be used entirely independent 
of the normal tools of information, incentivization, and regulation. Of course the two (rational-
actor tools and behavioral tools) are not entirely siloed. Some behavioral changes tap into tools 
traditionally recognized by rational-actor models, as in the smoking example; the graphic 
imagery is an extension of providing information. Noting examples like this, it would be 
unproductive to further belabor the differences and insist on defining tools as either entirely 
                                                 
50 Schiller, Ben. "U Of Recycling: Creative Signage Gives A Nudge." Fast Company, November 14, 2011. 
Sellers 30 
 
“rational” or “behavioral.” The two are often intertwined. This paper only does so here to 
demonstrate what it is that behavioral economics is providing that is new.  
The Origin of the Behavioral Interventions Through Nudges 
The pioneers of applying behavioral economics to policy, Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein outlined what they called “nudge theory,” which takes advantage of “nudges” to subtly 
direct human action without coercive or direct force. If negative behaviors are being made as a 
result of irrational behavioral factors (biases and heuristics), then changing the context or choice 
architecture (“the physical, social, and psychological aspects of the contexts that influence and in 
which our choices take place") of a system can change outcomes.51 Nudges sound complex, but 
in practice they are often easy to notice. Many will even ring as fairly intuitive to anyone who 
understands human character. Indeed, this is part of the beauty of the nudge. It takes advantage 
of small irrationalities in human behavior to produce outsized benefits. Many of these behaviors 
and fixes were obvious, yet for whatever reason, behavioral irrationalities were being 
overlooked, with nothing done to counter them. Through the framework of behavioral economics 
significant value has been gained for individuals and governments by capitalizing on 
irrationalities.  
This paper will often refer broadly to “behavioral interventions” as basically synonymous 
with “nudges”. This is done to express a broader category of interventions that may sometimes 
fall out of what explicitly can be considered a nudge. Additionally, this paper also seeks to avoid 
getting caught up in adhering to definitional considerations that linger if using Thaler and 
Sunstein’s original term “nudge.” The categories listed below are just some of the most common 
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and efficacious examples of nudges. Like with the discussed behavioral interventions, these are 
critical to understand because they are so ubiquitous to the world of behavioral economics. One 
will also notice that certain nudges partially overlap. For example, Thaler’s famed “Save More 
Tomorrow” program, in which participants automatically pay a portion of their future raises into 
retirement investment, is both an example of using defaults and commitment devices to secure an 
outcome.52 Again, the categories are meant merely as a classification, not as a comprehensive 
taxonomy.  
Defaults 
Making something the default option should not matter to a rational actor, as he or she 
will choose his or her preferred option regardless. Behavioral economics has revealed defaults 
actually matter an incredible amount. Despite its simplicity, changing something to a default is 
perhaps the most effective “nudge” ever designed. The increase of retirement savings primarily 
through defaults is arguably behavioral economics’ largest contribution to the policy world 
(Madrian & Shea, 2001).53 Benartzi and Thaler designed a program called “Save More 
Tomorrow” or SMarT which increased employee’s savings rates by default enrolling them in a 
program which automatically increased the percentage of their wages devoted to savings. 
Savings rates for SMarT participants increased from 3.5% to 13.6% while rates for one control 
group making their own decisions and another making one-off savings increases remained 
stagnant (Benartzi & Thaler, 2004).54 Additionally, in a now famous paper Johnson & Goldstein 
(2003) showed that having organ donations as the default choice caused consent rates of near 90-
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100% as opposed to countries that required an opt-in system which had consent rates of 
anywhere from 4.25% (Denmark) to 27.5% (Netherlands), despite the fact that these countries 
shared similar cultures. Take Austria and Germany for example: two strikingly similar cultures, 
but the compliance rate in the former is 99.98% versus only 12% in the latter.55 
 
Figure 2.1 The Effectiveness of Defaults as seen in Madrian & Shea (2001) 
Framing 
 The wording and presentation of facts and options matters significantly, even when the 
fundamental information conveyed is the same. For example, patients who are told that “90% of 
those” who have a certain operation are “alive after five years,” are substantially more likely to 
have the surgery than when they are told that “10% of those who have the surgery are dead after 
five years.” This conveys absolutely the same information, but shifts the focus to either the more 
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positive or more negative element (McNeil et al., 1982).56 Hasseldine et al. (2007) showed 
framing also matters in tax compliance. Letters with different framing (although all still making 
the same demands) were sent to 7,300 sole proprietors. One letter offered assistance with tax 
forms, another offered rational arguments as to why citizens should pay their taxes, and the final 
threatened an audit and penalties. The messages had vastly different success rates, with the 
threatening one being the most effective at encouraging tax payment.57  
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity, or the response to an action with an equivalent action, takes advantage of 
social dimensions which can shape human behavior outside of what is rational (Fehr & Gächter, 
2000).58  These exchanges are usually positive, but can be negative. One famous examples of 
reciprocity at work comes from charities which, in an effort to increase charitable givings from 
employees at a bank, gave out sweets as employees entered into their building. Additionally, for 
some employees the CEO sent out a personalized email. All employees were asked to donate a 
day’s salary to a charity and were given either one or both of the treatments (sweets and 
personalized email) or put in a control group consisting of people receiving only a control 
generic email from the CEO. Of the groups, the control group had only 5% donate; the group 
receiving the sweets alone donated 11%; the group receiving a personalized email alone donated 
12%, and the group receiving both the sweet and the personalized email donated 17%. 
(Behavioural Insights Team, 2013). Grocery stores intentionally try to generate reciprocity with 
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free samples, and clever salespeople try to do the same by starting with a big ask then slowly 
whittling it down to a much smaller ask.59    
Simplification 
 The trope that “more is better” is not always the case. In fact, when it comes to helping 
people choose optimal decisions, more is often worse in certain areas. Simplifying choices limits 
the complexity of a problem, ensuring that people aren’t deterred from enrolling in programs 
because of the time, expense, and complexity of enrollment. Additionally, complexity can 
seriously mar an individual’s ability to pick the most optimal option for one’s own situation by 
introducing unnecessary options that distract from making a reasonable choice.60 This is an 
especially pronounced effect when choices are being made about complex issues. Many potential 
options may be objectively undesirable to nearly all, but individuals who do not fully understand 
the choice that is being made are liable and in some cases even likely to choose poor decisions. 
This is partially an informational problem, but even though the information is available in some 
form, it can be hard to make sense of. Financial management issues are a common area where 
this kind of complexity is seen. Perhaps the most obvious examples of the simplification nudge 
is, again, in the area of retirement savings. Through a “Quick Enrollment ™” system, employees 
were able to enroll in a 401(k) plan at pre-selected contribution rates and asset allocations. At 
one company this system tripled 401(k) enrollments.61 Notably, Quick Enrollment ™ not just 
made enrolling easy, it simplified choices to a pre-selected asset allocation, reducing complexity 
and with it the risk of individuals unwittingly picking bad options out of ignorance. Most simple 
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retail investors will desire similar asset allocations. Additionally, portfolio theory shows that 
most options an investor could hypothetically choose would be objectively sub-par. Investment 
and areas of similar complexity well illustrate why too many choices can easily become a bad 
thing. The extensive paperwork associated with processes like taxation, insurance, application 
for benefits, application for college, and many others are areas ripe with potential simplification 
benefits.   
Social Norming 
 Social norming, or taking advantage of an individual’s desire to be accepted by others 
thereby pressuring said individual’s actions to be in line with community norms, is another 
consistently effective nudge. This involves telling individuals variations of “most people plan to 
do [x].” It is recommended that this information is kept as local and specific as possible to add to 
the effectiveness of this nudge (e.g., “nine out of ten people on your block pay their taxes” as 
opposed to “most of your neighbors pay their taxes”).62 Norming can have negative outcomes if 
it is found that most people are actually acting negatively, as this will encourage those formerly 
obeying the rules to now being acting negatively. For instance, Cass Sunstein recommends that if 
the target behavior is not currently being done by a majority, norming can still have the same 
positive impact by substituting, “most people are doing [x]” with “most people think people 
should do [x].”63 
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 Disclosure strategies of behavioral change are centered on giving people information that 
makes the effect of present and past decisions more evident. A traditional rational actor model 
would still expect changes in behavior based on new information, so the important contribution 
made by a disclosure arrangement is to clarify or make more present existing information. Food 
packaging, for example, may contain all vital nutrition information on it already, but it may be 
concealed on a back label. A disclosure strategy would involve making this information more 
visible and adding markings, like a green to red color scale to indicate the health of an item.64 
Bertrand & Morse (2011) tested disclosure strategies with payday lending borrowers. Many fail 
to appreciate the effects of interest, and a borrower underestimating payments can quickly find 
himself underwater.65 The payday loans studied, for example, had an annualized interest rate of 
several thousand percent. A simple disclosure chart highlighting the true absolute dollar cost of 
the loan, as compared to say a 20% APR credit card reveals how much a loan actually costs (see 
Figure 2.2). Showing, in this way, the effect in actual dollars as opposed to interest rates 
decreased borrowing in the subsequent four months of the study following treatment. This 
intervention is similar and often overlapping to the earlier mentioned strategy of framing. 
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Figure 2.2 Disclosure strategies in Payday Lending (Bertrand & Morse, 2011)66 
Pre-commitment 
Commitment devices are interventions used to achieve specific future outcomes by 
having individuals commit to something in the present that will change their outcome in the 
future by restricting future behavior or increasing the likelihood of certain outcomes. 
Commitment devices have been used in a variety of economic and health-related trails. BIT 
looked at reducing the number of “did not attends” in Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), 
by having a variety of behavioral commitment interventions including written commitments and 
normative messaging (i.e., indicating how many patients turn up on time for their 
appointments).67 A variety of these programs have been used to encourage savings, especially in 
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developing nations. Commitment devices such as restricting savers access to their own money, 
help individuals avoid impulse, and act in their own long-term best interest.68 
Reminders 
 Simple as they may be reminders are not something needed by a perfectly maximizing 
actor. The idea that providing reminders, especially timely ones, can impact behavior is not 
especially novel, yet this intervention is not used as actively as it could be. Studies consistently 
show that reminders can have small but consistent improvements on savings rates, college 
enrollment rates, and loan repayment rates. (Castleman, 2013; Cadena & Schoar, 2011).69  
Channel Factors  
 Channel factors are small, subtle stimuli or response pathways which influence an 
individual’s progress toward some behavioral outcome.70 If one thinks about the steps required to 
produce some outcome, channel factors are those influences which move a person along that 
final state. Some channel factors may be rational, but the behavioral economic relevance here is 
that often channel factors are minor details that should not be relevant to a rational actor. A 
classic example of this is when, in the 1960s, Yale researcher Howard Leventhal attempted 
persuade students to get a shot to inoculate tetanus by persuading them with pictures of tetanus 
victims. Even though his message was effective, and students were convinced that they ought to 
get inoculated, only 3% went versus 28% when Leventhal gave the students a map with the 
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campus infirmary circled and had the students pick and schedule for themselves a time to go to 
the infirmary. The map and the scheduling are channel factors, and despite being seemingly 
unimportant, they made an enormous difference in the outcome.71 
Conclusion: Toward New Behavioral Interventions 
Behavioral economics is leading us to a more efficient society, in which even small 
elements of interactions are looked at rigorously for sub-optimality. While the field will likely 
continue to grow, it has high expectations to meet in continuing to counter the concerns of its 
detractors. A better understanding of the human mind, could allow for there to one day be a 
universalized general theory of behavioral economics which explains all human deviations from 
rationality and the underlying causes of those deviations. Today’s approach to behavioral 
economics does not often take into account the psychological determinants of the discovered 
irrationalities, but one can imagine a day when the field would be able to.   
Such a broad field may better be described by what it is not. Behavioral economics is not 
about forcedly controlling behavior, it is not about political ideology, and it is not about 
establishing a more paternalistic society.72 Behavioral methods can influence people in small 
ways; it can never control someone’s thoughts in the way some commentators fear. Categorizing 
human behavior as irrational is not about pointing out any shortcomings of the morals or 
character of said people. Instead, behavioral economics deals with the ways in which humans are 
wired “incorrectly”; it deals with population-wide ways that human behavior differs from that of 
the rational actor model. These facts are essential to keep in mind as this paper begins its analysis 
                                                 
71 Leventhal, Howard, Robert Singer, and Susan Jones. "Effects of fear and specificity of recommendation upon 
attitudes and behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2, no. 1 (1965): 20. 
72 Supra., Note 10. 
Sellers 40 
 
of public housing. Interventions are not meant to “social engineer” as some have claimed, they 
are merely giving recognition to the fact that government policy, housing included, for long was 
ignorant of the importance of the phycological byproducts of policies.  
The next chapter of this paper, Chapter 3, will explain more about how behavioral 
economics interventions can be created and why interventions at the local level can be so 
successful. The chapter that follows will begin our discussion of public housing, before the final 




CHAPTER 3:  
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 The nature of behavioral interventions is that they are specific to a context and very 
dependent on empirical testing to see if the interventions hold in reality. Interventions in the 
abstract may appear that they are going to work because they take advantage of the same biases 
and heuristics as existing interventions, but other unknown or unseen influences might be at 
work and undermine the new intervention. This is not occurring because previous similar 
behavioral interventions were erroneous, the new intervention may just not carry over to new 
contexts for whatever reason.  
Take, for example, experiments in honesty priming, a behavioral intervention that tries to 
“prime” honest behavior by preceding the task with some intervention that is meant to put honest 
behavior at the forefront of his or her mind. This is done by methods such as prompting 
individuals to think about ethical choices, having them read a short passage about the importance 
of honesty, or having them sign something pledging their honesty at the beginning of a task. 
Once the individual is primed, some task is performed and the “honesty primed” group is 
compared to a control group. Applications often include self-reported information such as miles 
driven used for car insurance purposes, taxes owed, and alcohol and substance usage.73 
Hallsworth et al. (2014) found that found that through honesty priming and social norming, the 
UK government was able to increase the fraction of tax payers who paid their taxes on time.74 
Experiments like this are an exciting example of behavioral interventions at their best. The 
implication seems to be that by simply changing the way a message is given to people, 
                                                 
73 Hallsworth, Michael. "The use of field experiments to increase tax compliance." Oxford Review of Economic 




governments can make people behave more ethically. If this is really the case, governments 
around the world should immediate start implementing honesty priming policies to get their 
citizens to pay their tax on time as has been done in the UK. After all, to get this kind of result 
with rational-actor tools, the government would have to hire more tax collectors to monitor 
citizens or impose new politically unpopular regulations like stricter fines and penalties for not 
paying taxes in a full and timely manner. These are examples of “rational actor” tools; these 
tools no doubt work, but they can be clunky in that coercing behavior can be difficult in a 
democratic society, even if this behavior is for the betterment of the nation.   
The caveat to all of this is that the actual implications of interventions can be far more 
limited than they might initially appear. Perhaps there is something particular about citizens in 
the United Kingdom that makes them prone to respond to the interventions in the way that they 
did; it could be their culture, their sense of trust in their institutions, or even their perception of 
the effectiveness of government tax collectors. If that is the case, the results of this intervention 
may not be as exciting as they first appeared to be. Again, this is not because of erroneous 
practices in the initial experiment, intervention results are just context-dependent. Guatemala 
was interested in leveraging these results, and similar interventions done using behaviorally-
informed letters and social norming in the country appeared to be fruitful. Receipts from income 
tax payers more than tripled and “shaming” citizens in to paying their taxes seemed to be 
effective.75 One might expect that since other behavioral interventions in Guatemalan tax policy 
had shown success, honesty priming experiments would also perform well. Unfortunately, a 
massive study in Guatemala of 627,242 taxpayers with 3,232,430 tax declarations over the 
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course of four months showed no results. A range of treatments were administered: honesty 
declaration, information about public goods, information about penalties for dishonesty, and 
questions allowing taxpayers to select what they thought the money should be spent on, all had 
no impact on the average amount of taxes one declared (Kettle et al, 2017).76  
This result is disappointing, but further confirmation that behavioral interventions must 
be thoroughly tested in each new environment. The fundamental appeals of behavioral 
economics are still in existence, they just must be tempered by reality. Fortunately, interventions 
are often able to be tested through randomized controlled trials (RCTs) which provide ideal 
experimental design. Trials can be run in each new environment to confirm whether or not an 
intervention works, and through the accumulation of successes and failures, a better 
understanding of specific interventions and environments can be gained. Perhaps, cities are less 
susceptible to interventions that target social norming, than are rural areas. Potentially 
interventions that use defaults are most effective in contexts in which individuals have low 
information or are dealing with significant complexity. All of this can be tested. This is the 
research process in action; it is continually refining on a thesis, and because behavioral 
interventions are so often so well testable in the smaller contexts in which they will be used, 
clearer results can be gathered than with, for example, macroeconomic stimulus packages or 
other large-scale policy issues. Good control environments cannot always be had and too many 
confounding variables can muddy conclusions. 
 
 




The Appeal of Behavioral Economics Use at Local Level 
While many national programs have been created to focused on modifying government 
policy in light of behavioral economic insights, these reforms have yet to trickle to all levels of 
government. Local government including cities, townships, counties, school districts, and special 
districts have a smaller stature and lower profile than state and federal government, so they can 
be easy to pass over. In doing this, a grand opportunity is missed. In the United States local 
governments alone account for $1.5 trillion worth of government spending.77  
 Behavioral economics lends itself to extreme scalability. For each promising intervention 
that is found to work, replication can be attempted across the world. It is not zero-sum. 
Eventually each local environment can assemble its own “portfolio” of effective interventions. 
Behavioral interventions done or directed at the state and federal level can be effective in that 
they affect a lot of people. This top-down approach can work well to incorporate nudges that are 
well-known to work across a variety of contexts. Since there are only a few major agencies that 
would need to adopt these policies, it would likely be cheaper and politically easier to have 
implementation mandated from the top-down. A simple example of this is in countries which 
leverage defaults to increase organ donation. Rather than having to go county-by-county and 
convince each one of the merits of behavioral economics, a nation-wide agency can merely adopt 
a policy for the entire country. 
Because of the appeal of quick, one-step adoptions like in the example above, it can be 
easily to overlook the merits of a local, grassroots-type approach to behavioral intervention. 
Whether it’s done at the city, county, or even state level, a localized approach to behavioral 
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economics has its advantages. To begin, even if federal government agencies are using certain 
interventions implemented in a top-down fashion, there is no guarantee that this knowledge of 
behavioral best practices is getting distributed down to local entities. Even agencies sharing the 
same mission can be siloed in their implementation and individual roles. To get these practices 
implemented at the local level, policymakers may have to go city-by-city to ensure correct usage. 
From there, interventions that have been found to be effective in certain contexts can be spread 
in a grassroot style to other places. Michael Bloomberg’s What Works Cities program is founded 
on this idea. To quote the program, “cities come in all shapes and sizes, but they all serve the 
same mission: to help residents in the most effective ways possible.”78 With this attitude in mind 
and “bridging” type programs which connect knowledge and data between cities, good local 
policies can achieve larger scales. Indeed, Bloomberg’s program has taken up behavioral 
interventions as one of the ways to make changes at the local level. Local governments have the 
autonomy necessary to try out policies, without having to corral the high amounts of political 
capital necessary to make changes elsewhere. 
Outside of relatively infrequent interactions like voting in federal elections, tax payments, 
and military service, Americans have fairly little day-to-day and face-to-face interaction with the 
federal government. Although some federal agencies do have a significant presence around the 
country and many others shape important nation-wide policies, much of this is done behind the 
scenes or by funding and administering programs at the state and local level. The policy this 
paper focuses on, public housing, is a prime example of this, as although the federal government 
provides the funding for housing programs, they are administered at the local level by entities 
called Public Housing Authorities (PHAs). Recall that behavioral interventions are contextual 
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and happen at the hyper-specific level (e.g., changing the way forms are written, changing the 
size of dining plates, or changing the graphic on a label). Because of this, most of the 
opportunities to intervene and nudge people in a certain direction happens at the point of 
interaction between the government and an individual. Local government then is appealing for 
behavioral interventions if only because of the sheer number of interactions that happen between 
local governments and citizens. Local governments run and administer programs in a number of 
different policy areas including taxation, public health, energy and utilities, crime, education, 
transportation, and public assistance. The bureaucracy of local government is large and 
constantly interacting with citizens in everything from the collection of trash to the distribution 
of licenses. If each of these interactions is thought of as an opportunity, behaviorally-informed 
policymakers will be able to look at thousands of situations for behavioral interventions. The 
details of these interactions matter as we have clearly seen with behavioral economics, but too 
often these get lost as afterthoughts, especially at the local level.  
How to Create Behavioral Interventions 
Creating a source for consistent behavioral intervention in local government requires both 
the cooperation of behaviorally-informed policymakers and civil servants who are on the “front-
lines,” observing day-to-day irrationalities. Behaviorally-informed policymakers should have an 
in-depth knowledge of both behavioral economics and their specific policy realms. Their primary 
objective ought to be on finding the links between problems that are observed in local 
government, the biases and heuristics driving those problems, and the behavioral interventions 
which can be used to counter those specific problems. Figure 3.1 shows this for the example of 




Figure 3.1 Linking Problems Seen in Government to Behavioral Solutions 
critical to establish, but sometimes difficult. As we will see in public housing, it can be hard to 
see these links because the causation of problems is not always clear. If policymakers can 
establish this kind of a framework, they can essentially pull from existing knowledge in 
behavioral economics to find appropriate interventions that have been used in other contexts. 
Once these steps are taken, creating successful, behaviorally-informed policies is just a matter of 
adapting interventions to be used in the new contexts. A de-facto “codex” of sorts, full of all the 
collective knowledge of the field of behavioral economics (behavioral factors and interventions), 
is in the process of being assembling with each new paper published. Again, this makes the job 
of behavioral policymakers much easier, as they can readily plug-and-play existing solutions into 
new contexts. A secondary objective for them is to design new behavioral interventions to fit 
new contexts, but even without doing this, behavioral-informed policymakers can have a huge 
impact in helping governments to maximize their interactions. These individuals can hover 
around different local governments and groups to provide expertise and to learn from “front-
lines” civil servants. 
 “Front-lines” civil servants have a too-often overlooked role to play in designing 
effective behavioral interventions. Think of them as the sources of the data that behaviorally-
informed policymakers will then use to connect the dots between problems, biases/ heuristics, 
and interventions. They are important because if policymakers are given bad data, their 
intervention is going to be ineffective, as it is not targeting the right kinds of behaviors. Civil 
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servants include everyone from bus drivers to police officers to social workers. These people are 
directly interacting with the public, so they see all the problems in local government up close and 
understand the nuances of them. Some problems may be too small for policymakers to notice, or 
too convoluted for policymakers to connect to behavioral irrationalities. Civil servants can fix 
that by being the subject matter experts for persistent problems seen directly in their role. Still, it 
can be difficult to figure out how to best equip civil servants to begin participating in looking for 
new interventions. They need to have some understanding of behavioral economics, but they 
need not be experts. Cities should try out different iterations of programs to get civil servants 
informed and connecting with behavioral policymakers. 
Conclusion: Public Housing as a Test Case  
 Behavioral interventions are about redesigning the contextual and environmental features 
located around the individual to either mitigate or exploit the behavioral factors (biases and 
heuristics) which an individual is subject to. Public housing provides an attractive test case since 
it is an environment which residents are interacting with all the time. Additionally, there are a 
number of interactions residents must have with officials from PHAs and other local 
governmental and non-governmental groups. Chapter 4 will give a brief history of public 
housing in the United States and address the program’s current state. Chapter 5 will discuss the 
problems seen in public housing and make the critical distinction between problems seen in and 
problems of public housing. It will also discuss what the causal mechanisms underlying these 
problems are. Chapter 6 will take the framework used in chapter 5 to discuss the irrational 
behavior-related causes of problems in public housing, before chapter 7 will finally discuss 





PUBLIC HOUSING DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY 
 Public housing in the United States operates to give low-income families and individuals 
access to modest affordable housing to help them avoid homelessness and housing instability. 
“Public housing” is a term often used inexactly to describe all publicly funded or assisted 
housing programs, but the term applies to a specific federal program that is one the main ways 
that rental assistance is given to low-income Americans, the others being “Section 8” housing 
vouchers and project-based rental assistance (PBRA) (See Appendix C for a full description of 
all of these).79 Housing vouchers, or “tenant-based” rental assistance, subsidizes families who 
rent private apartments, and “project-based” rental assistance (PBRA) contracts with private 
owners to rent some of the units of a housing development to low-income families. Importantly, 
public housing (as outlined in The Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949) which predates other 
government rental assistance programs, differs from other programs in that the state actually 
owns and administers residential properties rather than just subsidizing families to be housed in 
private residences.80  
 Since the 1960s and 1970s public housing has developed a decisively negative reputation, 
and as such it has declined in usage in lieu of other affordable housing schemes. Although public 
housing was first was proposed as a progressive-era sanitation measure to clear cities of 
“diseased” slums, it has become to many synonymous with crime, racial segregation, and 
violence.81 Notably, while the federal government does occasionally appropriate money to 
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Review 60, no. 2 (1993): 497-501. 
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renovate existing public housing properties, since the mid-1990s there has been a moratorium on 
building additional public housing.82  
A Brief History 
 The actual construction of federal public housing in the United States first began in the 
depression era with a mission to both provide housing to poor families who lacked a residence. It 
was created to be another federally funded public works construction project, part of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal efforts to create jobs and fuel macro-economic growth. In 
1937, Congress passed the first Housing Act which authorized the construction and 
administration of public housing. The bill created the United States Housing Authority (later 
superseded by the House and Home Financing Agency and eventually today’s Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)) to lend money to state and local governments for the 
construction. Although federally funded, this program would be managed by local Public 
Housing Authorities (PHAs), of which there are over 3,000 today.83  
 The beginning of World War II forced resources to be diverted away from public housing 
projects, but by wartime nearly 200,000 units of public housing had already been built. These 
existing units housed wartime workers, and a short time after the war was over Congress passed 
another Housing Act, now of 1949, to restart the federal housing project. In an effort to ensure 
that the neediest receive housing, but that the private market for rentals was not crowded out by 
public housing, large policy changes ensured that only poorer citizens would be allowed 
residence. From 1952 to 1962, the number of families receiving income from public and private 
                                                 




assistance programs rose from 29% to 46%.84 Additionally, this period saw the first major swing 
in the racial makeup of public housing, as the number of non-white families increased from 36% 
of tenants to 46%. This era of legal discrimination and segregation saw many white communities 
oppose the construction of public housing in areas near them. Even after the abolishment of 
segregation, a process of denying services called “redlining” combined with racism and 
NIMBYism to forced PHAs to build public housing in areas far away from wealthy and/or white 
communities.85 This was the beginning of the widespread segregation of public housing still 
evident today. Through the 1950s and 1960s these trends were reinforced by the post-war 
housing boom, increased rates of housing ownership, and wide-spread suburbanization.86 
 Public housing rents were expected to cover the operating costs of units, but this was an 
impossible task. The 1969 Brooke Amendment to the National Housing Act fixed the rent that 
any public housing household could pay to be no higher than 25% of income (later bumped to 
30%).87 At the same time, these units were also tasked with providing housing to the poorest of 
families, many of whom were either single parent households or households with one or more 
parents unemployed. Where once public housing rents covered 95% of operating costs, by the 
mid-1980s, rents covered only 43% of costs. The result was that PHAs deferred maintenance for 
even relatively critical things.88 Without adequate subsidies or income, properties fell into severe 
disrepair, and the popularly known image of public housing as a “blight” was cemented. In the 
decades to follow, this situation of segregated and increasingly impoverished residents, 
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inadequate funding, and increasingly decaying properties shaped the debate around the success 
and necessity of public housing.89  
 This was not merely an issue of funding. Housing projects drew widespread criticism for 
taking too long to build and for being too expensive.90 As such, in 1973, Nixon placed a 
temporary halt on the construction of new housing projects until revisions of the public housing 
program could be considered and made. For the first time, major alternatives to publicly 
constructed and administered housing, such as a voucher system, gained public steam. After a 
trial program authorized four years earlier, The Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974 created the Housing Choice Voucher Program Section 8. “Section 8,” as it is commonly 
referred to, introduced the other rental assistance measures introduced earlier in this chapter, 
vouchers and project-based rental assistance. Unlike PHA-administered public housing, Section 
8 housing authorizes subsidy payments to private sector run real estate in hopes that it will 
increase the cost effectiveness of subsidized residences and further spread out would-be public 
housing tenants in hopes to avoid segregation and the negative clustering effect thought to 
emerge from many urban high-rise style public housing complexes. Additionally, Section 8 
sought to decrease the necessity for new, publicly financed construction, long a point of criticism 
of the original public housing program. Although new public housing was still being constructed 
the annual amount trickled to less than 40,000 new units per year after 1975 versus 275,000 units 
provided through various other Section 8 measures.91 The 1980s saw further government 
withdrawal from public housing as additional measures were put in place through the Urban-
Rural Recovery Act of 1983 and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987. These 
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new measures sought to solidify and expand Section 8 programs, while limiting the number of 
new public housing developments that could be built.92  
 The 1990s would usher in one of the most significant decades of change to public 
housing, and the reforms introduced in this decade would shape the current state of public 
housing to this day. In 1989, many of the same concerns with the physical and social well-being 
of public housing lingered, so Congress created a National Commission on Severely Distressed 
Public Housing to identify strategies for the improvement of national public housing. In 1992, 
the final recommendations of the Commission were released in a 200-page report finding: 
“residents living in fear of crime, high unemployment and limited opportunities for employment, 
insufficient resources to address the needs of residents, disincentives to self-sufficiency, and 
housing that had deteriorated to the point that it was physically dangerous”                    
– (Congressional Research Services Report for congress R41654)93 
 In response to the Commission’s report the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1992 created the Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing program or HOPE VI. 
This program provided major grants for the re-development and demolition of many public 
housing units. As of 2010, over $6.1 billion had been approved by HOPE VI for over 250 
grants.94 The program specifically tried to target the worst offenders, 86,000 units that had been 
listed in the 1992 Commission report as “severely distressed.” These units were either 
demolished or modified from larger high-rise style residences into smaller, more attractive units 
that blend in to the surrounding city. While this program demolished some of the most notorious 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 10-12. 
93 Housing and Urban Development, The Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public 
Housing, Rep. No. R41654 (1992). 
94 Supra., Note 88. 39-42. 
Sellers 54 
 
public housing projects, it remained controversial due to its high expense, questionable 
efficiency, and strategy of displacing residents through demolition of. Alongside HOPE VI 
reforms, no new additional public housing has funded and HUD instead focused on renovating 
and revitalizing existing public housing properties.95  
Insufficient Funding 
 As public housing fell out of the public favor, units hurt badly for funding. The 1937 Act 
which had created public housing in the United States had no provision for maintenance or 
upgrades. Operating expenses and other necessary renovations were expected to be funded out of 
revenues generated by tenant’s rent payments. PHAs were significantly handicapped from 
making large building re-investments as they were forbidden, by law, from accumulating 
reserves in excess of half a year’s expected rent collection.96 Still, through the 50s and 60s costs 
rose due to an aging capital stock and inflation. At the same time costs were rising, income 
sources for public housing were sinking due to new policies meant to put a cap on maximum 
tenant rent payment and maximum tenant income allowed. Congress passed the aforementioned 
Brooke Amendment in 1969, capping tenant rent contribution to be no more than 25% of family 
income due to tenant complaints. Around the same time, caps were placed to limit the number of 
“over-income” families that could live in public housing. Understandably, HUD and Congress 
wanted to prevent housing subsidies from going to families that could afford to pay a full rate, 
but these new rules meant that only the poorest families would be allowed in public housing.97 
PHAs were thus continually forced to take a smaller percentage of a shrinking pie. Later reforms 
increased allowed tenant contribution and later HUD subsidies made many PHAs solvent again, 
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but by that point many public housing complexes had fallen into severe disrepair. HOPE VI 
provided some additional money for necessary renovations, but even with less public housing 
units today, federal funding is still insufficient for complete modernizations of the nation’s 
ageing housing stock.98 
The Current State of Public Housing 
Although the popular image of public housing is that of a bland urban tower block high-rise like 
the now infamous Cabrini-Green Homes or Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago (seen in Figure 4.1 
and 4.2), public housing can take many forms including low-rise buildings, scattered site 
properties, and even some mixed-income developments. Even in the mid-1990s, when the 
nation’s total number of public housing units was at its highest, only roughly 27% of units were 
high-rises, as opposed to 32% garden apartments, 16% walk-up units, and 25% single family 
homes in that same year. Today, the median housing complex has 50 units, and fewer  
 
Figure 4.1 Cabrini-Green Homes (left) & Figure 4.2 Robert Taylor Homes (right) 
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than 800 total housing complexes have 250 or more units (Figure 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show lower-
density public housing complexes). Another popular assumption, that public housing is mostly 
located in urban areas, is mostly correct. About 40% of complexes are in non-urban areas  
 
 
Figure 4.3-4.5 (top to bottom) Ramona Gardens (Los Angeles, California); Hammel Houses (Queens, New 
York); and McDonnell Avenue Apartments (Biloxi, Mississippi) 
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including 21% in rural areas and 19% in the suburbs.99  
 Today, roughly 1.1 million public housing units are still in existence, down from about 
1.4 million at the peak of public housing’s usage.100 Most of the high-rise “problem complexes” 
which generated public housing’s negative stereotypes, were transformed or demolished and 
their residents relocated.101 Although the Congress’s mentioned National Commission on 
Severely Distressed Public Housing found that some public housing was on the brink of 
unlivable, this extreme is limited to units HUD has designated as severely distressed, meaning 
that the complex is dilapidated, with high vacancies, backlogged repairs, rodent and cockroach 
infestations, and high risk for disease. Additionally, many substandard units may approach these 
conditions, but as a percentage of total housing stock, the number of these units are small.102 
Severely distressed units account for around 7% of total housing stock, with another 8% 
designated “substandard.”103 Overall, public housing still appears desirable to many, as PHAs 
have long or closed waitlists, and American Housing Survey data actually reveals that 
nationwide, public housing residents report higher levels of housing satisfaction than do 
unassisted low-income renters.104 In New York, the city with the highest number of public 
housing units, around 66% of residents in conventional public housing report that they are 
satisfied with it. This is lower than for voucher holders (voucher holders reported around 80% 
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satisfaction), but still not exceptionally bad.105 Lastly, most public housing units are old, with the 
current average age of units being around 30 years old. Troublingly, this is about the length of 
useful life for most housing of this type, so an increasing number of public housing units may be 
expected to fall into disrepair as the costs and challenges of keeping up with aging buildings 
mount106. 
 Residents come from a wide spectrum of ages and family situations, as there are no legal 
restrictions limiting housing properties to certain family sizes and ages. To qualify for most 
public rental assistance programs, including public housing, households must be “low income,” 
meaning that household income may not exceed 80% of the local median income. Additionally, 
by law at least 40% of new families entering public housing must be “extremely low-income,” 
meaning that their income is no greater than the higher of the poverty line or 30% of the local 
median. Public Housing Authorities, in practice, often exceed this percentage of tenants in 
extremely low-income by a wide margin due to public housing’s high demand.107 Typically, 
today’s tenants pay 30% of their post-deduction income to the PHA for rent and utilities. This 
number is federally regulated and largely inflexible. Looking at resident demographics as a 
percentage of total public housing residents, elderly households make up about 30% of public 
housing, disabled households about 21%, non-elderly/non-disabled households with children 
make up bout 35%, and non-elderly/non-disabled households without children are only 14%. Of 
households with children around 75% are female-headed, mostly single parent, households. 
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Racially, about 45% of public housing residents are Black, 21% Hispanic, and 32% White (non-
Hispanic).108 Mean income sits at only $14,642 per household.109 
Conclusion 
 Overall, what are we to make of public housing? While the program had its share of high-
profile disasters, which doubtlessly made residents worse off, on the whole, public housing units 
have served many residents well. Clearly the popular vison of the program as wholly an abject 
failure is over-simplistic. There is a high degree of variation between these different outcomes, 
and due to so many confounding variables, it can be hard to know the cause of this. One things 
that is clear, the need for affordable housing, especially in America’s largest cities, has not 
abated. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, the United 
State is home to 9.9 million low-income renters, yet at the same time there has been a shortfall of 
over 5 million rental units affordable to these renters.110 Clearly, the problem of securing 
affordable housing has not ended; thus, despite a decline in the prominence conventional public 
housing, it is important to find ways to assuage the problems of public housing and similar 
programs in a cost effective and efficient manner. The next chapter, chapter 5, will look at 
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PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING 
 In looking at what the problems with public housing are, it is important to consider what 
we expect to get out of the system. In the broadest of interpretations, there are many known 
economic “problems” with public housing. For instance, because public housing allows tenants 
to pay rent rates that are lower than market rate, it will require subsidies to make up the gap 
between rent revenues and construction, operation, and maintenance costs. This alone is a 
problem, but it is innate to the design of public housing and expected. Because public housing’s 
purpose is to provide housing to those with a household income that is 80% or below the median 
rate, it expectedly follows that public housing units will experience higher rates of poverty and 
likely higher rates of the negative effects which are shown to correlate with higher rates of 
poverty. This chapter will discuss current problems in public housing and how concentrated 
poverty, as appears in public housing, has been shown to worsen outcomes through a 
phenomenon called “neighborhood effects.” This definition of the problem may appear obvious 
and inconsequential, but it is imperative to clarify because it changes how policymakers are 
supposed to view and assess public housing. Note that although this paper talks generally about 
these problems found in public housing, as the last chapter (Chapter 4) demonstrated, there is a 
wide degree of variation within public housing from complex to complex and city to city. 
Readers must keep this in mind since some of these problems, crime for instance, may not 
particularly be a problem in some areas, even if it is a problem overall in most of public housing. 
 It is important to differentiate between the problems of public housing and the problems 
seen in public housing. Figure 5.1 portrays the difference by mapping out the connections 
between the two. Essentially this mapping shows that a number of different factors contribute to 
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the problems seen in public housing, and while some of those are problems of public housing 
itself, some, specifically the mal-effects of poverty and an innate scarcity of resources due to rent 
controls and limited government funding, are not. This figure will serve as a reference to discuss 
this chapter’s content, and help frame the next chapter on behavioral problems in public housing. 
It is important to reinforce that while figure 5.1 is useful for 
 
Figure 5.1 Visualization of the Problems in Public Housing 
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visualizing connections between the various effects in public housing, it should not be taken as 
rigorously and clearly as, say, an equation is. The causal factors as outlined in this figure, as will 
further be discussed, are often poorly understood and unable to be separated from one another for 
purposes of understanding the magnitude of each contributing factor.111 Resultantly, a clear 
linkage between cause and effect is difficult to establish. For example, it is largely impossible to 
say whether low levels of educational attainment are generally present in public housing 
complexes due to poverty or due to certain other neighborhood effects. Even if connections as 
those given in this example could be made, they will not likely hold up across the whole 
population of public housing units. This latter point touches on the important fact that problems 
in public housing are highly variable from complex to complex. The severity of problems seen in 
one area, for example, may not correlate linearly or consistently with the level of poverty in that 
area. Many other unknown factors may be contributing. Again, the results are not as clear cut as 
those in an equation. Finally, causality can be confusing to establish in this figure because some 
of the problems seen in public housing may be feeding into others. There are several vicious 
cycles like this at play within the figure. Mismanagement by public housing authorities, for 
example, can be seen as both a problem seen in public housing and potentially a problem of 
public housing. Unemployment is also a problem seen in public housing, but it is also a 
contributor to poverty and poverty’s subsequent mal-effects. Fortunately, while it is helpful to 
speculate at the cause of problems seen in public housing, a full understanding of the causes of 
these problems is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. The next chapter focuses only on 
likely “irrational” behavior-related causes of the problems in public housing, so an accurate 
mapping in figure 5.1 becomes less of an immediate consideration. Due to the uncertainty of 
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causality, there remain significant controversies about the cause of and solutions to problems in 
public housing.112 This paper will mention a few of these controversies, while ultimately 
remaining able to side-step them in proceeding to chapters 6 and 7, since these chapter focus 
only on finding and countering irrational behaviors within public housing, not on wholesale 
reform.  
 This paper inevitably confronts two different main ways from which to look at the 
problems of public housing. The first perspective asserts that the negative effects seen in public 
housing (figure 5.1’s red box) are merely there because of the high levels of poverty and since 
poverty, regardless of where one lives, is correlated with these negative factors, then public 
housing units appear to have worse outcomes. This view assumes that public housing is a neutral 
force. Public housing tenants should fare about the same as a control group with similar 
characteristics and incomes.113 The second perspective asserts that public housing worsens the 
negative effects or creates new problems that makes life worse than would be expected at a given 
level of poverty. In this view, public housing is a negative force, which hurts residents.114  
 Because of the number of confounding factors and a wide variety of public housing in 
terms of unit types and quality, it is difficult to ascertain which perspective is correct. Both of 
these stances seem held more out of ideology than out of any weight of compelling fact. If the 
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first viewpoint is right, only poverty and the innate scarcity of resources in public housing would 
be contributors to problems seen in public housing. If the second viewpoint is right, public 
housing itself is the source of additional problems, and someone equally poor would be better off 
without public housing due to the problems it creates. While the second viewpoint may go too 
far in stressing the negative effects of public housing, there does seem to be some credibility to 
the underlying argument that something about public housing is sometimes worsening observed 
effects. This something is negative “neighborhood effects” (the leftmost of figure 5.1’s two 
green boxes), a broad term used to describe the idea that neighborhoods have either a direct or 
indirect effect of its resident’s behaviors.115 Here concentrated poverty leads to negative 
neighborhood effects. It is still the mal-effects of poverty which cause problems seen in public 
housing, but this extreme concentration of these mal-effects creates a worse environment which 
hampers the outcomes of those in public housing. In this view public housing is bad only so 
much as it concentrates poverty. As figure 5.1 shows, it is still possible that there are other 
problems of public housing which arise from factors other than concentrated poverty, but it is 
unclear if these effects exist and if they do, what the cause of them is (this is represented by the 
top right-most blue box with a question mark). If these effects do exist, they would exert some 
kind of additional “penalty” on residents just because these residents live in public housing 
(controlling for both poverty and concentration of poverty). Since these effects are uncertain, the 
box marking this effect has simply been marked with a question mark. Ultimately, whether 
problems of public housing exist or not, the behavioral interventions written in Chapter 7 will 
still hold valid as potential effective interventions.  
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 Although the particular concern of housing policymakers ought to be on these effects of 
public housing (figure 5.1’s green boxes) since these effects are the most relevant to consider in 
future housing policy decisions, it is still important to look at the problems seen in public 
housing effects as a whole. For the purposes of this paper, even if public housing residents are at 
the same level for negative outcomes due to poverty, these negative outcomes are still just as 
concerning. Fighting the exacerbated effects (the effects of public housing) as opposed to 
negative effects associated with a certain level of poverty is analogous to fighting the negative 
consequences of a particular policy versus fighting poverty as a whole. Both are important, but 
one is more realistic in its scope. Since public housing provides for a population with high 
concentrated poverty, behavioral interventions ought to focus on fighting both problems when 
possible.  
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, historical changes in tenant demographics have 
occurred, and public housing has gone from housing residents of many different income levels 
and races, to now housing mostly the poorest of the poor from almost exclusively minority 
backgrounds. Today half of HUD Public Housing residents earn less than 25% of area median 
income.116 Public housing did not cause intense poverty, but there is evidence to show that public 
housing is, in some instances, exacerbating it and at the very least not delivering on promises of 
neighborhood quality (Newman & Schnare, 1997; Dillman, Horn, & Verrilli 2017).117   
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 Despite America’s ethos of opportunity, prosperity, and social mobility, more than 16 
million children live below the poverty line.118 Circumstances at birth, sadly, will have a decisive 
impact on the trajectory of these children, as 6 in 10 born in the lowest income quintile will 
never escape from it.119 Poverty is not just about having less money; it correlated with a number 
of quality of life measures. As mentioned, there remains significant controversy around public 
housing’s effectiveness and potential downsides, but that these negative effects (the problems 
seen in public housing) correlate with poverty is well accepted (Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016; 
Ellen & Turner, 1997; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000).120 In this way, the biggest overall 
problem with public housing is that it creates negative neighborhood effects and a clustering of 
negative effects through the concentration of poverty.121 This paper will also confront this issue 
so much as this concentration of poverty feeds into the creation of negative neighborhood 
effects. While the existence of neighborhood effects remains controversial (see: Goetz & 
Chapple, 2010), there is recent compelling evidence in support of it, and even without negative 
neighborhood effects, public housing still provides an effective venue through which to combat 
the negative effects of poverty through behavioral interventions.122  
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Problems of Public Housing 
Neighborhood Effects 
 A neighborhood, as defined by Chaskin (1997), defines the “spatial construction… in 
which residents share proximity and circumstances that come with it.” The neighborhood is 
different than, but obviously always interacting with, the community, which Chaskin defines 
broadly as the sum of “all connections, of a social, functional, cultural, economic, or of any other 
nature”.123 Social scientists agree that exposure to disadvantaged neighborhoods has negative 
consequences for outcomes and is a critical factor in perpetuating intergenerational poverty 
(Ludwig et al., 2013; Massey, 2013; Sampson, 2012; Sharkey, 2013).124 The idea that the zip 
code one is born into determines one’s outcomes as an adult runs fundamentally counter to the 
American ethos of social mobility, yet, according to the model estimates of researchers, “the 
expected lifetime income for people born into the bottom quartile of the neighborhood income 
distribution would be $910,000 greater if they were instead raised in a top-quartile 
neighborhood, controlling for regional differences in purchasing power” (Chetty, Hendren, 
Kline, & Saezet, 2014; Rothwell & Massey, 2015).125 
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 As mentioned, many different detrimental effects—crime, social immobility, poor health, 
and more—have a high association with poverty. Furthermore, a large body of literature shows 
that concentrated poverty places burdens on poor families “beyond what the families own 
individual circumstances would dictate”.126 In other words, concentrations of poverty can worsen 
these effects such that public housing projects, for example, with high poverty concentrations 
will make such detrimental effects even worse than what would normally be expected at a 
specific level of poverty. Continual exposure to these detrimental effects of poverty and negative 
neighborhood effects has been identified as a major contributor to racial stratification in the 
United States.127 
 Still, observed outcomes are difficult to understand, and the mechanism by which 
neighborhood effects shape these outcomes are even harder to fully understand. Brookings 
Senior Fellow Alan Berube gives the example of looking at the limited academic achievement of 
teenage youth in areas of concentrated poverty to illustrate this point, “Is [it]… the result of his 
family being poor, the result of being in a classroom where the majority of his classmates are 
also poor, or the result of limited academic achievement among his peers, regardless of their 
socioeconomic status?”.128 Even understanding why people stay in areas that seem to be so 
harmful is difficult. Are specific poor families “trapped” in areas of concentrated poverty, or do 
they remain there by choice due to available affordable housing, social networks, or some other 
cultural or economic factor? Anecdotal evidence and research lends credence to both of these 
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hypotheses.129 While significant research effort has been expended to find and quantify the 
relationship between neighborhoods and outcomes, comparatively less has been put into 
discovering the potential underlying causes mechanisms of these effects. Looking at figure 5.1, 
this means that while neighborhood effects of some forms are well-established, their connection 
to the problems seen in public housing, the arrow, is relatively uncertain. Even research that has 
looked at causality, has been far from conclusive in determining which of several hypothesized 
mechanisms are most robust.130 Causality will be reexamined in the next chapter on potential 
behavioral causes of problems seen in public housing. For a full discussion and literature review 
of hypothesized causal mechanisms see George Galster’s 2010, The Mechanisms of 
Neighborhood Effects: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications.131  
Concentration of Poverty and Segregation 
 One of the largest trends that Section 8 Housing, a subsidy voucher program, was meant 
to correct was the significant concentration of poverty and de facto segregation caused by public 
housing. Public housing, in its current form in the United States, clusters together many people 
with abnormally low incomes and low rates of employment. Public housing was predominantly 
constructed in already poor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods, further increasing the 
concentration of poverty and segregation.132 It is well established that high rates of minority 
                                                 
129 Vale, Lawrence J. "Public housing and the American dream: Residents’ views on buying into “the projects”." 
Housing Policy Debate 9, no. 2 (1998): 267-298. 
130 Supra., Note 111. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Supra., Note 88. 
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poverty and continual segregation will produce a high degree of concentrated minority poverty 
(Massey & Denton, 1993; Massey & Fischer, 2000).133 
 The issue of concentrated poverty became such a concern that in the 1970s the US 
Census Bureau even created a measure to officially designate concentrated poverty zones. 
Census tracts with 20-39% of residents falling below the poverty line are designated “poverty” 
zones, and tracts with 40% or more residents falling below the poverty line are considered “high 
poverty” (sometimes called “extreme poverty”) zones.134 While all ill effect of poverty are 
troubling, the primary concern in looking at neighborhood effects is separating the “normal” 
association between poverty and these effects from the “interaction” effects that come from 
concentrated poverty. It is these interaction effects that are of real interest because it is these 
effects that public housing, by concentrating poverty, is potentially contributing to.  
 From 2000 to 2015, concentrated poverty was on the rise; the number of poor in high-
poverty neighborhoods has nearly doubled from 7.2 million to 13.8 million, the highest number 
ever recorded.135 High-poverty cities were a major concern in the 1960s-1980s, but the 1990s 
bought a favorable economy, nationwide low unemployment and policy changes that favored the 
poor such as the earned income tax credit and an increased minimum wage.136 High-level 
concentrated poverty had dropped by over a quarter from 9.6 million to 7.2 million, but after 
2000 a reconcentration of poverty has occurred.137 Even without a change in the macro-level 
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poverty rate, there has been a change in where the poor reside.138 These increases were underway 
even before the great recession, although the recession certainly worsened the effects.139 
 Again, public housing alone certainly did not create this problem. The cause of poverty 
concentration varies greatly between localities. Secular economic change such as American de-
industrialization, especially in the Northeast and Midwestern cities, left these cities poorer.140 
Less skilled workers in these urban areas were especially hard hit.141 As major cities in this area 
declined, middle-class families left in droves to instead live in suburban areas. Formerly it was 
white families in an era of legally enforced segregation, who were engaged in so-called “white-
flight” in the 1950s and 1960s, but after the end of legal segregation, middle-class minority 
families also left for the suburbs around 1970-2000.142 While legal and de-facto housing market 
discrimination also may have contributed to more recent segregation, legalized discriminatory 
policies such as the aforementioned “redlining,” the denying of services to certain racial or 
ethnic groups based on location, have an ugly legacy of creating a significant portion of initial 
segregation in the United States.143 Family structures weakened, and, for a variety of reasons, by 
1990 64% of black infants and 18% of white infants were born to unmarried mothers.144 A high 
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number of these infants were raised by single mothers, which research consistently indicates 
means children are more likely to grow up poor because of their parent’s low earnings.145  
 Lower prices and a strong sense of NIMBYism in middle and upper income 
neighborhoods forced urban public housing units to be built in already poor, minority 
neighborhoods which often lacked access to good transportation and jobs.146 Additionally, public 
housing works by intentionally grouping many of the poorest of the poor together. About 16% of 
public housing units are located in census tracts in which over 50% of housing units in said tract 
are public, and about 40% of all units are located in census tracts in which over 20% of housing 
units in said tract are public.147 With the mean income for a public housing household sitting at 
about $14,642 (64% of households below 30% median income and an additional 21% of 
households below 50% of median income), public housing, by design, in the way that it has been 
implemented in the United States almost inevitably increases concentrated poverty.148 Roughly 
37% of public housing units are located in “extreme poverty” census tracts (at least 40% of the 
population is below the poverty line).149 Families in public housing are much more likely to be in 
distressed neighborhoods, whereas public housing primarily for the elderly and disabled was 
more likely to be in lower poverty areas.150 Only 7.5% of all public housing units were in census 
tracts with poverty below 10%.151 Because of this, residents in public housing are more likely to 
be in an area of concentrated poverty than someone of equivalent poverty not in public housing. 
                                                 
145 Mincy, Ronald B., ed. Black males left behind. The Urban Institute, 2006. 
146 Bickford, Adam, and Douglas S. Massey. "Segregation in the second ghetto: Racial and ethnic segregation in 
American public housing, 1977." Social Forces 69, no. 4 (1991): 1011-1036. 
147 Supra., Note 88. 
148 Supra., Note 104. 
149 Council of Large Public Housing Authorities. Assessing the Economic Benefits of Public Housing: Final Report. 
By Econsult Corporation. January 2007. 
150 Supra., Note 117. 
151 Ibid. 10. 
Sellers 74 
 
In public housing, more 40% of children live in areas of “extreme poverty,” whereas nationally 
only 15% of children nationwide who are considered poor are in areas of “extreme poverty.”152 
That number rises to 23.3% of black children and 20.7% of Hispanic children when looking at 
specific minority groups, but it is still lower than public housing’s rate of children living in areas 
of concentrated poverty. Children who live in a family receiving Housing Choice Vouchers 
(Section 8) are also still poor, but they are much less likely to live in tracts of “extreme poverty,” 
with only 12.1% of black children and 13% of poor Hispanic children living in these 
environments.153 A report by the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institution and 
the Community Affairs Offices of the Federal Reserve provides case studies of some of the most 
endemic cases of concentrated poverty, and shows that while impoverished areas across the US 
may have varied causes and occur in varied geographic locations, the negative results that come 
from clustered poverty are much the same.154 In light of the negative neighborhood effects of 
concentrated poverty, policymakers must consider the serious downsides that public housing 
may bring, just by contributing to this concentration of poverty. 
Observation of Neighborhood Effects 
 Much of the evidence that has been gathered about the negative neighborhood effects of 
concentrated poverty has come out of the study of specific housing policy changes. These policy 
changes have provided researchers with the rare opportunity to run experiments on such a large 
scale. The following three policy changes (Gautreaux, HOPE VI, and Moving to Opportunity) all 
involve residents moving from locations with highly-concentrated poverty to locations with less-
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concentrated poverty. All three have been intensely studied to try to understand the 
comprehensive effects of relocation as a way to mitigate the negative effects of neighborhood 
effects and poverty. In place of a complex understanding of the causal mechanisms behind 
neighborhood effects, these policy changes can show whether neighborhoods themselves appear 
to be what is affecting people. While hundreds of studies have verified that outcomes vary by 
neighborhood, the results of studying these experimental set ups are critical in confirming that it 
is something about neighborhoods themselves that are causing failure or success. 
 The first policy change came through the so-called “Gautreaux” program. In 1966, black 
tenants in Chicago public housing brought several lawsuits against HUD and Chicago’s PHA 
alleging that the housing authorities had deliberately kept minorities from white neighborhoods 
by placing them in specific, substandard, highly segregated public housing sites. By 1976, the 
case had made it all the way to the supreme Court and the court ruled in Hills v. Gautreaux in 
favor of the plaintiffs. In response, many Chicago public housing families were given housing 
vouchers, with some choosing to move and others choosing to stay. This program, later called 
Gautreaux I to distinguish it from a few, smaller programs that mimicked its original design, 
provided one of the only social programs in the US that was based on a randomized quasi-
experiment. Plenty of research has looked at Gautreaux I. Initial results have shown that 
Gautreaux had indeed done its job of allowing families to move to less impoverished areas, with 
average neighborhood poverty rates for residents declining from an average of 40% 
impoverished to only 17%. More importantly, this trend appears to be persistent as over two 
decades after the initial movement parents and adult children have remained in neighborhoods at 
or near the same low poverty levels as the ones they were located into (DeLuca & Rosenbaum, 
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2003; Keels et al., 2005).155 Results from Gautreaux were seen to be overall positive, although 
short of some of the drastic changes reformers had hoped for. 
 Last chapter briefly covered the federal HOPE VI program, which has provided money to 
renovate or destroy “severely distressed” public housing developments. Renovations and 
renovations tapped into the philosophies of new urbanism and Oscar Newman’s defensible space 
theory, and sought to build single-family units rather than rebuild the high-rise style apartments 
which had gained national notoriety. Sometimes, in lieu of new developments, voucher systems 
were put in place to simply relocate families to privately owned residences of their choice with 
the goal of increasing resident self-sufficiency and improving neighborhood conditions of 
residents.156 
 The program has been found to have a mixed effectiveness overall with a wide variation 
of results across the program’s many projects. Optimistically, the program has been shown to 
decrease violent crime, increase property values, and decrease concentrated poverty (Popkin et 
al., 2004; Popkin, 2010; Aliprantis & Hartley, 2015).157 Unfortunately, some research has found 
that the use of Section 8 vouchers has done little to increase the economic outcomes of residents, 
sometimes not even moving them to neighborhoods that were much better off economically 
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(Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; Curley 2010).158 Additionally, many voucher movers can find it 
difficult to re-establish ties in new neighborhoods, especially if those neighborhoods are mixed 
income and mixed race. For some individuals, the disruption of the move seemed to break 
whatever loosely-held grasp on stability had been achieved, outweighing the positive effects of 
the move (Popkin, 2010; Chaskin, Khare, & Joseph, 2012; Tach, 2009). Overall HOPE VI has 
certainly helped deconcentrate poverty, but other problems, such as a lack of alternative 
affordable housing, may keep former residents from accessing better neighborhoods or reduce 
the positive neighborhood effects potentially reaped from better neighborhoods.159   
 Based partially on the evidence from Gautreaux I, the federal Moving to Opportunity 
(MTO) program was created by HUD in the Clinton era as a more rigorous randomized control 
trial to test if moving people to better neighborhoods could alleviate poverty and cause better life 
outcomes. Between 1994 and 1998, across Baltimore, Boston, New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles 4,600 low-income families with children were assigned by lottery into three groups: a 
control group which will stay in public housing, a regular-voucher group which received regular 
housing vouchers, and a “low-poverty” voucher group which allowed usage of the voucher only 
in neighborhoods with a poverty rate of 10% or less. For a while this MTO seemed to generate 
mixed results. The families that moved displayed no greater gains of employment, earning, nor 
improved test scores for the children of mover families when compared to the control group 
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(Kling, Liebman, & Katz 2007; Oreopoulous, 2003; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).160 There were 
some smaller offsets to crime among these families, but these mixed results led to significant 
debate among experts about the effectiveness moving can have on the impoverished families, 
until very recently. 
 Despite decades of research, only within the past three years have the most compelling 
results about the effects of neighborhoods been found. New studies put out by economists Raj 
Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren have leveraged new data to make the most compelling argument 
yet that neighborhoods do matter and that moving individuals from bad neighborhoods to good 
ones can have positive impacts (Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016; Chetty & Hendren, 2015).161 
Returning to the MTO data and combining it with tax returns for the children of MTO 
participants, the researchers were able to find that the children of families in the MTO treatment 
group had significantly better outcomes into adulthood than did the control group (see figure 
5.2). This data does not contradict earlier finding, it was simply not in existence to earlier 
researchers; the children of the MTO experiment had yet to age enough to be studied. 
Improvements in outcomes were found in the children of the moving household, not in the adults 
of the household. Earning improved so much so that the net present value of increased lifetime 
earning of children who move at age 8 was around $100,000. Additionally, children who moved 
young were more likely to attend college, more likely to be married, less likely to live in a high-
poverty area, and less likely to have out of wedlock children. These findings were dubbed 
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positive “childhood exposure effects”. Perhaps Chetty and his colleagues’ most significant 
finding was that the younger children were at the time of the move, the more they benefitted. 
Thus, for every additional year children spent in a low-poverty area, the better off they were, 
with one important caveat. If children were over 13 at the time of the move, the move actually 
harmed outcomes, assumedly because the of the disruption that moves can cause in the lives of 
children. 
 
Figure 5.2 Comparison of Earning from MTO Children 
Major Problems Seen in Public Housing 
 As previously mentioned, studies of public housing residents have shown a number of 
problems to be afflicting these residents more than the general public: crime, worsened 
adolescent development and educational attainment, worsened physical and mental health, 
unemployment, a lack of social mobility, a lack of savings and assets, and a lack of social capital 
and community. These are the problems seen in public housing mentioned in the red box of 
figure 5.1. This is not meant to be a comprehensive listing of all problems seen in public 
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housing; it is merely a discussion of some of the most prevalent and written about problems. As 
figure 5.1 shows us, it is helpful to think of these problems seen in public housing as symptoms 
of other root problems. Poverty, a lack of PHA resources, and potentially neighborhood effects 
are the root problems. This chapter will close with a discussion of these symptomatic problems, 
before turning to try to discover some of the underlying behavioral problems that are partially 
responsible for how these root problems bring about these symptomatic problems.  
Crime 
 By the 1980s and 1990s, towering urban high-rise housing projects, built in this style to 
maximize the cost effectiveness of public housing, became popularly associated primarily with 
high levels of crime. Critics of this style of public housing argued that it created a high 
concentration of poverty, and this concentration was said to worsen overall crime. Indeed, 
between 1990 and 1994, PHAs spent over $4 billion on crime reduction and prevention alone, 
including things like additional police officers, tenant patrols, fencing, lighting, and security 
cameras ($500 million of this spending came from Chicago alone).162 The most notorious high 
rises were subsequently demolished, just decades after their construction through HOPE VI. 
Although many worried these policies were merely displacing crime, rather than reducing it, 
subsequent studies have shown that these movements and demolitions have had a net reduction 
in violent crime at the city level, implying that public housing had an effect that was not additive 
and neighborhood effects were present (McNulty & Holloway, (2000); Aliprantis & Hartley, 
2015).163  
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 In 1997 the Chicago Public Housing Authority ran a lottery which randomly offered 
vouchers to 18,000 families of the 80,000 applicants. Among voucher recipients were both 
public housing residents and market rate housing residents. Those living in market rate 
residences typically didn’t change their type of neighborhood (in terms of neighborhood poverty 
rate), so the voucher amounted to an increase in income alone. In contrast, those voucher 
recipients living in public housing saw the same absolute increase in income while also 
relocating to a new neighborhood.164 Since the new neighborhoods the former public housing 
residents moved into still had a relatively high level of poverty, only limited economic benefits 
were seen, but benefits were seen in other areas, most noticeably in reduced violent crime. 
Voucher winners who were formerly public housing residents experienced a 40% drop in 
neighborhood poverty and, resultantly, there was a 50% drop in violent crime arrest for children 
ages 12-18.165  
 Before Chicago’s worst housing complexes were demolished in the 1990s, these 
complexes had an average poverty-rate of around 77% (versus a city average of only around 
20%). While 90% of residents from these public housing complexes relocated to somewhere else 
in Chicago, homicides were reduced across the city by 7.5%. This could be seen directly in 
violent crime reductions around the areas where public housing high rises used to be. 
Additionally, as might be expected, there was not an increase in homicides in the neighborhoods 
in which former public housing residents resettled. Assault and battery crimes saw similar 
reductions of this nature to a slightly lesser degree. 166 An additional longitudinal study across 10 
different urban areas upholds the idea that voucher recipients do not cause significant new 
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numbers of crime in areas they move to, and any new numbers of crimes are more than offset by 
a more significant reduction in crime in old areas (Popkin, Rich, Hendey, Hayes, & Parilla, 2012; 
Ellen, Lens, & O’Regan, 2012).167  
 An example of how these problems seen in public housing can create vicious cycles is 
present for public housing crime. Research has shown that high levels crime can reduce the 
social cohesion and collective efficacy of neighbors (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997).168 
Additionally, if residents, especially women, believe their neighborhood to be unsafe, they are 
less likely to be physically active and less confident in their ability to maintain a healthy degree 
of physical exercise (Bennett, et al., 2007).169 
Adolescent Development and Educational Attainment 
 Poverty and growing up in poor neighborhoods can have significantly detrimental effects 
on children and young adults in a range of different areas. Recent work has shown that low 
income families experience a variety of hardships including food insecurity, health problems, 
violence at home, and inaccessibility to high performing schools.170 The so called, “Coleman 
Report,” produced by the Department of Education in 1966, linked the economic and 
demographic composition of a school’s student body to the educational outcomes of individual 
students.171 Perhaps unsurprisingly, wealthier schools showed higher educational achievement, 
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and additional studies since have continued to find the same result (Saporito & Sohoni, 2007; 
Burdick-Will et al., 2011).172 Federal Moving to Opportunity programs shows that children who 
relocated to better locations saw an increase in the quality of their education, increased study 
hours, increased parental support for their education, and, despite more rigorous schools, no drop 
in grades received.173 
 Environment plays a large role in one’s development into adulthood, and this is not 
limited just to education (Sampson, Sharkey, & Raudenbush, 2008).174 Exposure to early 
neighborhood disadvantage increases the likelihood of early and unwed childbearing, poor child 
health outcomes, poor grades, low completion rates in high school and beyond, and joblessness 
and depressed earnings in young adulthood (Massey & Brodmann, 2014).175 
Public Health and Mental Health 
 The problems of public housing are more easily visible in the physical decay of housing 
units or in the poverty and lack of economic advancement of housing residents, but the negative 
effects of public housing can even be seen in resident health outcomes. Poverty is well known to 
be associated with detrimental effect to health, but the exact negative health effect attributable to 
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public housing and the environment it creates and tends to be located near is uncertain. A study 
in the American Journal of Public Heath found that the “overcrowding and poor-quality housing 
[found in many public housing complexes has] a direct relationship to poor mental health, 
developmental delay, heart disease, and even short stature” (Bashir, 2002).176 Certain reports 
paints a grim picture of daily life in public housing projects including higher than average 
exposure to harmful chemicals and exhaust fumes, infestation of germ-carrying insects and 
vermin, trash and junk littering walkways and yards, and the mental pressures of stress, fear, and 
isolation (Schell & Denham, 2003).177 Infants and children, are especially at risk to these 
negative effects while in their developmental stages. Other studies have found that housing 
complexes are often located in areas with higher levels of pollution and lower than average 
environmental quality (Braubach 2012).178 Lead poisoning, in particular, has been prominent. 
This is perhaps the most incontrovertible sign of negative health effects in public housing, as 
even small amounts of it can kills brain cells and produce significant harms to infants.179 
 The Moving to Opportunity program suggests that families living in low-poverty areas 
had improved health outcomes (Goering & Feins, 2003). Four to seven years after their 
relocation, adults in mover families showed lower rates of obesity (11%) and better mental 
health outcomes, despite having roughly the same rate of employment and public benefit 
participation as the control group. Additionally, young females who had moved exhibited a much 
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lower level of psychological distress and lower rates of arrest.180 A summary of empirical 
evidence from 13 articles across five different housing mobility studies concluded that these 
studies suggests that neighborhood matters, so even the poor living in a more prosperous 
neighborhood would be much better off. Primarily this would come through lower rates of 
substance abuse, better mental health, less violence, and significantly less obesity (Acevedo-
Garcia, et. al., 2004).181  
Unemployment and Lack of Social Mobility 
 One notion of public housing is that it is temporary assistance meant to help people get 
back onto their feet. This is largely inaccurate. While about 20% of current public housing 
residents have been there for less than a year, over half of current public housing residents have 
been residing in the same unit for over five years. About 14% have been in the same unit for over 
20 years.182 Although some of this longevity of tenants is due to the high number of elderly in 
public housing, this is only a portion. Much of this immobility means residents are getting stuck 
in areas of high poverty concentration, and subsequently are suffering from substantial negative 
neighborhood effect. This is especially pressing if these families have kids, as the results from 
Moving to Opportunity shows that children are those most likely to have their lives improved 
from a change in neighborhood. Unfortunately, the notion that most public housing residents are 
unemployed is true. Currently only 34% of residents have any wages.183 Nationally, the 
unemployment rate for even those without a high school degree is only around 8% (this only got 
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as high as 16% during the worst of the 2008 Financial Crisis). Compared to the national average, 
these unemployment rates may seem high, but research has found that public housing residents 
are not atypical in their low employment numbers when looking at similar populations in private 
housing (Reingold 1997).184 Unemployment and a lack of social mobility are entangled with 
many of the other problems seen in public housing. 
Savings and Assets 
Poverty is fundamental to public housing, and fundamental to poverty is a lessened ability to 
save. The poor pay a higher percentage of their income to purchase the necessities of life: food, 
housing, clothing, utilities, etc. Living paycheck to paycheck is more than an expression to most 
public housing residents. In fact, analysis of an Bureau of Labor Statistics data suggests that the 
poorest in America, including most of those in public housing, spend well over 100% of what 
they make every year from income and public assistance, forcing them to borrow or draw from 
savings.185 Resultantly, the median net worth of a poor family living in poverty in Detroit, 
Michigan is $1,000.186 As the last chapter discussed, this is how residents of public housing 
succumb to the behavioral factors involved in the scarcity mindset. Scarcity exacerbates present 
bias, and understandably those just trying to make ends meet are not focused on saving for a 
future that is decades away (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).187 
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Figure 5.3 Fifty years of savings with lines showing compounding interest rates of 10%, 6%, and 2% 
Asking those in poverty to just “save more,” is unhelpful and can be considered condescending if 
it comes from those who do not intimately know their financial situation. Saving perhaps seems 
impossible. The bias of over-optimism about the future dominates, and residents do not see a 
present need to save. The problem is, that when residents start saving for retirement it will be too 
late, as they will not be able to benefit from the significant returns garnered from compounding 
interest. Say residents start with $1,000 in principle in an investment account and save only $150 
a year (about 1% of annual income), at an interest rate of 6% in 10 years only $3,767.96 has been 
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saved, but in 50 years $61, 970.54 has been saved (see figure 5.3). This is the magic and curse of 
compound interest, and because of it, residents cannot afford to not save and invest.  
Lack of Social Capital and Community 
 In all the literature on public housing, arguably the most ink has been spilled on the social 
and community elements of public and affordable housing. The social and community aspect of 
neighborhood effects in urban high poverty concentration neighborhoods has been portrayed by 
most scholars as highly dysfunctional and interwoven into the many other problems experienced 
in high poverty concentration areas (Wilson, 1987; Elijah Anderson, 1990; George Galster, 
1995; Venkatesh, 2006).188 For example, sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh explains how poverty 
creates a series of surprising informal relationships to create a complex and unrecorded internal 
economy. Venkatesh gives the example of religious leaders making tacit alliances with gang 
leaders to keep peace, and many perform a series of odd jobs for in-kind payments in lieu of 
cash.189 In this way, the social structure in high poverty areas can be simultaneously supportive 
and limiting, and despite the overall adverse effects of concentrated poverty locations, moving to 
new areas through voucher programs or other relocation programs and break certain important 
local ties which are hard to or sometimes not at all established in new neighborhoods (Curley 
2009).190  
 Social capital in poor urban neighborhoods continues to be underdeveloped, yet this 
resource is key to improving quality of life in high poverty areas (Lang & Hornburg, 1998; 
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Postlewaite, 2011).191 Case studies show that higher levels of social capital have the same 
positive effect as home ownership in terms of improving neighborhood stability and outcomes 
(Temkin & Rohe, 1998).192 In looking to measure social capital, it is important to look at a 
community’s “collective efficacy.” It defines this as “its cohesion, shared values, expectations, 
and trust.” 193 Unfortunately, in groups of Chicago public housing residents, community efficacy 
was found to be strikingly low. For example, asking parents if they believed that people in their 
neighborhood can be trusted yielded only 25% saying yes. In the average Chicago neighborhood 
around 68% answer yes, a full 43% higher. As the Urban Institute notes, social networks are a 
necessary way to make ends meet for low income families, but these residents aren’t finding that 
they have that kind of social safety net in their neighborhoods.194 
Physical Distress of Public Housing 
 At the beginning of the life of public housing, the program focused on what’s often 
referred to as “slum clearance” meaning that as part of the development of new public housing 
units, old private units nearby deemed insufficient for occupancy had to be cleared. This 
“equivalent elimination” principle, while seemingly a well-intentioned measure to improve urban 
design and sanitation, constrained the flexibility of public housing developers. Not all of the 
cleared houses were in such bad condition as to merit complete demolition, so those areas that 
were primed for replacement were often poor, predominantly minority neighborhoods in urban 
areas. This measure meant that public housing must also be built in crowded urban areas on 
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expensive lands versus on much cheaper suburban lands. This further pressured already 
constrained PHA budgets.195 In addition to the quality concerns for public housing, individual 
room design was often quite austere: rooms were small, dining areas often had insufficient space 
to fit a family dining table, closets were built without doors, and tenant often had to pay to get 
what would normally be considered essentials like cabinets and showerheads. Buildings were 
densely populated, but still often lacked any kind of recreational spaces, and parents often 
complained that what parks or playgrounds did exist were far from the complexes, making it 
difficult for them to monitor their children. This is perpetuated by the fact that of the 39% of 
tenants with children, 91% were single parents and another 4% were disabled.196 
 Physical distress of this housing hit a high in the 1980s and 1990s, forcing Congress to 
act through the HOPE VI replacement and revitalization program. Still, even with nearly $6.1 
billion distributed through this, approximately 260,000 public housing units have been declared 
unsuitable for habitation since the 1990s.197 Additional units are declared “severely distressed,” 
and although not “uninhabitable” yet still have huge backlogs of repairs and struggles with 
problems like rampant vandalism, poor construction, and negligent management. While most 
developments meet their goal of providing decent, affordable housing to those who need it, those 
developments which have spiraled into inhabitability are far worse off than just being outdated or 
run-down; they are improper for all but the most desperate.  
 For many of these housing complexes, trouble was seeded at the beginning of their lives. 
Many were constructed in simplistic fashions out of cheap, non-durable materials. Costs were 
constrained from the beginning and groups that potentially faced rivalry from public housing 
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lobbied to ensure that the public units built would be unacceptable substitutes for private sector 
real estate.198 Corners were cut on insulation, interior furnishing (cabinets, closets, etc.), 
plumbing, electric installation, and unit size. The result has been residences with shorter life 
spans and inadequate accommodations. Beyond just initial design and construction issues, there 
has been a real problem in many complexes ensuring the upkeep of the property. Sometimes 
poor materials and design directly caused the problem, other times these factors just exacerbate 
the harms caused by poor maintenance. For example, despite most urban public housing being 
built in a high-rise design, elevators are often broken.199  
 Not only is public housing distress unpleasant for residents, it increases the expense of 
operation and maintenance for PHAs and HUD. Problems like obsolete mechanical and electrical 
systems, old plumbing, and consistent breakage in public areas demands more time from 
maintenance staff and contractors. Harvard’s Graduate School of Design prepared a report for 
HUD, outlining the costs of public housing operation and found that, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
older public housing properties (classified as properties over 26 years old) cost 10% more to 
operate than equivalent properties built within the past 10 years.200 This alone is only part of the 
problem. One of the key findings of Congress’s 1992 report on severely distressed public 
housing is that vacancies are one of the reasons public housing complexes can descend into a 
state of perpetual disrepair. Distressed public housing authorities often have high vacancy rates. 
A combination of managerial ineffectiveness and maintenance staff shortage prevents new 
housing units from being assigned and readied for occupancy as quickly as they could be. Each 
additional vacant unit is not only lost income for a public housing authority, it’s also increased 
                                                 
198 Supra., Note 81. 8. 
199 Supra., Note 81. 9-10. 
200 Harvard Graduate School of Design. "Public housing operating cost study." (2003). 
Sellers 92 
 
costs for otherwise unnecessary expenses such as increased security, eviction of squatters, and 
vandalism and graffiti cleanup.201   
  Despite concerns of the contrary, public housing generally has no effect on the value of 
surrounding properties. That is except for in cases of public housing that has been labeled 
“distressed” which can, due to an extreme concentration of poverty, increase overall poverty of a 
neighborhood. Research done by HUD has found that this concentrated poverty can undermine 
the viability of local businesses, schools, civic institutions and exacerbate crime. One reason is 
that concentrated poverty can put a strain on city services, both for services dedicated directly to 
poverty-alleviation and for those just related to general public services.202 Cities with high 
poverty rates spend approximately $294 more on poverty-alleviation and approximately $813 
more on general public services than cities with low poverty rates.203 Further research has shown 
that for every increased percentage uptick in poverty, an additional $27.75 is added to per capita 
expenditure on general public services.204 
Public Housing Mismanagement 
 Public Housing Authorities vary widely across the country in terms of their design and 
effectiveness. Some control just a few complexes, while others, like the New York City Housing 
Authority, the country’s largest, controls about 17% of all public housing units nation-wide. It’s 
usually large urban PHAs which come under scrutiny. In 2010 146 PHAs were marked as 
“troubled” due to mismanagement, insufficient operating margins, poor maintenance, high 
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vacancy rates, and uninhabitable units.205 Although the number went down to 38 in 2014, this is 
largely because of a loosening of the rules, rather than some dramatic PHA improvement. 
Troubled PHAs are notorious for taking too long to conduct small requested repairs, frequently 
not meeting health and safety code, not cleaning up or trying to prevent vandalism, and delaying 
leasing (leading to high vacancy rates).206 Many of the problems with PHAs are tied to rational-
actor factors like poor incentives and ineffective regulation, but PHAs are organizations of 
people and thus susceptible to behavioral factors all the same.  
Conclusion 
 The discussion of this chapter has served to provide evidence to begin looking to 
behavioral problems in public housing. Recall the framework presented in Chapter 3. It is 
important for behaviorally informed policymakers to look at all the problems present in a policy 
area before sorting them out and deciding what is and isn’t behavioral. The opening of this 
chapter did that by providing figure 5.1 and a discussion of how it operates. The rest of the 
chapter discussed the elements of figure 5.1 to get a clearer understanding of all the problems in 
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CHAPTER 6:  
APPARENT BEAHVIORAL FACTORS (BIASES AND HEURISTICS) AT WORK IN 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
Confronting all the many complex and multidimensional problems in public housing with 
a tool as subtle as behavioral economics seems daunting and perhaps impossible. Indeed, 
behavioral economics alone is not enough to take on the many problems present in public 
housing, but it was never designed to. Behavioral interventions are no cure-all. Interventions are 
only meant to attack a specific cause of problems: “irrational behavior-related” causes of 
problems in public housing, as shown below as the red circle in figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 Stratifying the Causes of Problems in Public Housing to Find Irrational Behavior-Related Causes 
The question this paper seeks to answer is not how all problems in public housing can be 
solved, but how behavioral economics can help make a difference in the lives of public housing 
residents on the margins by correcting for behaviorally rooted problem in public housing. As 
Chapter 2 showed, some of these problems can be associated with behavioral biases and 
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heuristics which can either contribute as the primary cause of the problem or act to confound the 
problem.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, and modeled through figure 5.1, the problems seen 
in public housing are themselves complex and hard to establish causal chains for. The main 
contributors to these seen in problems, were poverty, which is shown to correlate with certain 
mal-effects, PHAs’ lack of resources, and negative neighborhood effects, which occur primarily 
Figure 5.1 (reproduced) Visualization of the Problems in Public Housing Highlighting Where Causal Factors 
Fit (Figure 6.1 Represents a Detailed Look at Highlighted Arrows) 
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because of a concentration of poverty. As was also discussed in the previous chapter, the 
establishment of causality is difficult to make and there are many suspected causal factors. This 
chapter will look further at some of the potential causes of these factors and ask how poverty and 
concentrated poverty are part of the causes of the problems seen in public housing. Why does 
poverty produce so many of the problems we see? Why can neighborhoods influence the 
behavior of individuals?  
These causal factors explored in figure 6.1 represent the arrows highlighted in the above 
reproduction of figure 5.1. Each arrow is an amalgamation of all different types of causal factors 
including causes which are not at all related to behavior, causes which are related to rational 
behaviors, or causes which are related to irrational behaviors. Looking at figure 6.1 is like 
zooming in to see the detail of one of the arrows. The amount of each type of causal factor 
contained in each arrow varies with what root cause each arrow is emanating from. Figure 6.1 is 
helpful in that it shows how these different causal factors can be broken up to dissect only those 
causes which are relevant to this paper.207 Admittedly this model of breaking up figure 6.1 and 
its connections to figure 5.1 is more of an aspirational framework to help us understand the 
situation, but in the real world we cannot divide up these causations so accurately. This is an 
ideal state, but it is a helpful one to visualize what behavioral interventions can and should target. 
While current research has not discovered all the different casual factors at play in public 
housing’s problems, the potential causal factors can still be categorized. The large, light-blue 
circle in figure 6.1 represents all possible causal factors of the problems seen in public housing. 
Scarce funding, for example, would fall into this category, as it is a likely to cause of some of the 
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problems seen but not related to the behavior of a rational actor nor the behavior of an irrational 
actor. Within this circle is a green circle which represents all “behavior-related” causes of 
problems in public housing. As the figure notes, this includes “rational actor” type behaviors 
such as a response to incentives, new information, and regulation. Like in the circle above, there 
are innumerable examples of what might be in this circle. Perhaps residents or PHAs did not 
have a proper incentive to take care of their property. This would lead to unfortunate outcomes 
for the quality of public housing complexes, but it would be a “rational” choice. Criminal 
activity, if it is the only source of income, may also be a “rational” behavior causing problems in 
public housing. These are all essential sources of problems to look at in public housing, and 
almost certainly larger causes of problems than irrational, behaviors, but these negative 
contributors are countered by making changes to the rational equation through mechanisms like 
effective policy, not through behavioral interventions. This means that the only causes of 
problems this paper is concerned with are those found in the small red circle. This circle 
represents causes of problems due to “irrational” behavior caused by some heuristic or bias. This 
paper will diagnose what some of these potential biases and heuristics are below, before then 
providing ways to counter them with behavioral interventions in the next chapter.  
The difference between rational and irrational causes can sometimes be hard to identify. 
Consider this example: public housing residents and other individuals in poverty are far more 
likely to take out a short-term, high-interest payday loan. The interest rates on payday loans are 
substantially higher than those on equivalent means of credit such as credit cards. Too often 
these individuals take out payday loans, but underestimate the amount of interest they will owe, 
often meaning they cannot repay them, only worsening their financial situation.208 If the poor are 
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resorting to payday loans because they do not have viable alternatives, and payday loans are 
what makes the more financial sense for them, then this is a “rational” actor issue outside of the 
scope of behavioral economics. But, if the poor choose payday loans because of behavioral 
“irrationalities,” such as present bias, over optimism about their ability to pay back, and, say, an 
emphasis on quick, inaccurate, system 1 type calculations, then this is a causes of problems seen 
in public housing (the problem seen here is a lack of assets and savings) which can be countered 
with behavioral interventions. Indeed, in this example, evidence would point to the latter as 
being more descriptive of why payday loans are so heavily used by the poor.209 Even if some in 
poverty are acting rationally in taking out payday loans, if others are not, behavioral 
interventions are still of use to those acting irrationally and will not have an impact on those 
already acting rationally.  
Since behavioral economics is not a unified theory, and we do not understand all the 
complexities of the human mind, this paper cannot be comprehensive or exact in diagnosing all 
the potential “irrational behavior-related” causes of problems in public housing. Instead we must 
try to find ways individuals are causing problems by acting “irrationally” in public housing and 
match these acts to existing known biases or heuristics. While this is a disadvantage, in that 
certain unknown or unrecognized biases and heuristics may also be at work, this is an inevitable 
problem of working with behavioral economics. 
Apparent Biases and Heuristics at Work 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, to understand potential “irrational” behavioral factors at play, 
policymakers need not discover their own biases and heuristics. They need only look at the 
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existing behavioral economics “codex” that is forming as an accumulation of known biases and 
nudges. The following are apparent biases and heuristics likely at work in public housing based 
on the problems seen in public housing. Since public housing is primarily a problem of 
concentrated poverty, many of these effects affect impoverished individuals as a whole, but are 
made worse by the extreme concentrations of poverty often present in public housing. 
 “Scarcity Mindset” 
Building on previous research, in their 2013 book, Scarcity, economist Sendhil 
Mullainathan and psychologist Eldar Shafir present something called the “scarcity mindset” 
which expresses how scarcity, be it scarcity of time, money, food, or any other essential life 
factor can impair processing capabilities.210 The human mind narrows to focus on the scarce 
item, allowing for more precise attention to be given to it, but this focus also causes adverse 
effects.211 A new behavioral concept generated by this scarcity mindset is that of mental 
“bandwidth.” This behavioral principle says that we have limited mental processing capacity and 
overwhelming this limited capacity results in less capable behavior (a “tax” on our bandwidth) 
which will tend to worsen our situation.212 The effects of this bandwidth tax are surprising, 
affecting even qualities that are traditionally thought to be personality or skill dependent such as 
patience, attention, and dedication.213 We become “less insightful, less forward-thinking, and less 
controlled” (Kaplan & Berman, 2010; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).214 Later work 
further suggests that the use of Kahneman’s Type 2 thinking, the slower, more analytical form of 
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critical thinking, takes up significant mental bandwidth, leaving the mind only able to perform 
type 1 thinking in situations other than the one type 2 thinking is concentrating on at the moment 
(Schilbach, Schofield, & Mullainathan; 2016).215  
While focus allows people to be more concentrated, it also leads to a behavioral principle 
called “tunneling.” Mental bandwidth expresses how our processing capacity is limited, but 
tunneling describes how we actually confront issues. Think of how the mind creates a dangerous 
“tunnel vision” in order to focus on immediate scarce needs. Tunneling causes individuals to 
narrow their focus only on what is immediately in front of them rather than on other, less 
immediate concerns. Because of this, the scarcity mindset is linked to other behavioral biases.216 
Present bias is perhaps the most obvious. Rewards in the present far outweigh long-term 
considerations.217 An extreme focus on accomplishing one thing, say perhaps on finishing an 
assignment near a deadline, will lead to neglect of longer-term considerations of currently non-
scarce things like health and money (Laibson, 1997; Thaler, 1991).218 Additionally, tied in with 
scarcity is “ego depletion,” or the idea that self-control and will power are limited; use of these 
mental forces requires mental bandwidth which is limited.219 Poverty, scarcity of money and 
wealth, in particular has been shown to diminish self-control (Spears, 2010).220  
Friction costs are seemingly small or insignificant costs or barriers to programs or 
services which can deter individuals from applying or registering for said programs in ways that 
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rationally shouldn’t when looking at the benefit of the program (Currie, 2004). The costs aren’t 
just monetary. Friction costs can be lengthy or complex forms, documentation requirements, or 
processes. The UK’s Behavioral Insights Team even found that an extra required mouse click 
will reduce clickthrough rates.221 In processes such as taxation or college application which can 
be so complex that individuals seek external assistance, an increased burden is placed on low-
income individuals who don’t have the time or money to seek outside assistance.222 Still, these 
are seemingly small barriers to outsized gains such that these barriers should not deter a strictly 
rational actor.  
Lastly, myopic procrastination occurs as a result of limited bandwidth and a narrow focus 
on certain scarce resources.223 This behavioral flaw is fairly straightforward: people put off 
decisions or tasks and, detrimentally, focus only on the short term. Experiencing scarcity triggers 
a number of cognitive biases and heuristics due to the limits it places on mental bandwidth. 
Mullainathan and Shafir write that the negative effects placed by these cognitive limits can lower 
a person’s effective IQ be as much as would be the case without a night’s sleep (roughly 13 
points less). The authors called these culminating influences a “scarcity trap,” as the mindset 
created by scarcity only serves to further perpetuate scarcity. The scarcity-afflicted find 
themselves playing catch-up in many areas while already juggling many things on their mind. 
This is at the heart of the scarcity trap. But not all scarcity is created equal. As the authors write, 
“dieters can take a break from their diet. The busy can take vacations. [But] one cannot take a 
vacation from poverty. Simply deciding not to be poor—even for a bit—is never an option.”224 
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Scarcity in Poverty 
The scarcity mindset can potentially help explain why those in poverty have such bad 
outcomes in so many areas that can only be indirectly related to having little money. 
Mullainathan and Shafir call this the “elephant in the room” for poverty researchers.225 Part of 
the struggle with helping people in poverty is that they do not seem to always be acting in their 
own best interest. The facts are overwhelming and cover a range of different contexts. Take 
diseases for example. Diseases such as diabetes and HIV are not curable, but with proper 
pharmacology they are manageable. Still, even in developed countries where these drugs are 
relatively accessible diabetics take their medication only 50-75% of the time. As a result, 
diabetes and other diseases still kill and maim millions. Overwhelmingly those least likely to 
take their medicine are the poor. Poor farmers, mostly in the developing world, fail to weed and 
fertilize properly despite having the time and knowing the benefits. Parenting research shows the 
poor are often worse parents in terms of being harsher with kids and less connected. The poor 
have higher rates of obesity, lower rates of vaccination, and worse health habits. Even public 
assistance is taken up at surprisingly low rates.226 It is painful to observe, but, as the researchers 
explain, even accounting for factors like the potential bias of researchers observing these actions 
of the poor and other explanations of this nature, there is an undeniable mass of evidence.227 This 
evidence is disturbing to researchers who often are in their line of work because of deep 
sympathy for the poor. Undoubtedly, many of these things can be somehow traced back to 
systemic disadvantage or economic costs. For example, obesity is at least partially more 
prevalent because unhealthy food is cheaper, but as tempting as it is to just look at these 
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explanations, it would be a negligent omission to rule out other behavioral factors just because 
we find them unpalatable. A quote from one of Mullainathan and Shafir’s earlier papers on this 
subject best sums up the explanation for “the elephant in the room”: “the behavioral patterns of 
the poor…[are] neither perfectly calculating nor especially deviant. Rather, the poor may exhibit 
the same basic weaknesses and biases as do people from other walks of life, except that in 
poverty, with its narrow margins for error, the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more 
pronounced ways and can lead to worse outcomes.”228 Many of these negative behaviors have 
little or no associated ties to monetary value, but the poor still do more of them. Although these 
statistics are relatively well known, they are often ignored and disregarded as unsatisfying and 
insulting to those in poverty who these researchers are determined to help.229  
Previous explanations for “the elephant in the room” centered on the existence of a 
nefarious “culture of poverty,” in which poverty so changed the poor that they develop a sub-
culture that tends to perpetuate their own poverty (Lewis, 1959; Lewis, 1966).230 The 
unsatisfying immediate implication of this seems to be a sort of social Darwinism in which the 
poor must be acknowledged as fundamentally inferior, less competent people. For this reason 
and others, this argument was largely rejected by most academics, but the evidence of the poor 
not acting in their own self-interest remained soberingly clear. Mullainathan and Shafir fill a 
critical knowledge gap by providing an explanation as to why so many of these negative 
outcomes remain apparent: the stresses and pressures of poverty itself are mentally limiting. A 
vicious cycle entraps people in poverty, as poverty-related concerns dominate a poor individual’s 
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mental bandwidth, leaving less room for other tasks. What is fortunate is that the scarcity 
problem is not a moral or personal flaw but a “contextual outcome.” As the behavioral 
understanding of poverty improves, policymakers can increasingly understand how context and 
resultantly, outcomes, can be changed.231  
Social Dimensions 
 Social dimensions, as were earlier discussed, significantly impact our choices beyond 
what is economically rational. Still, it is worth keeping in mind that not all socially-related 
actions taken by actors are irrational. Many actions, even if negative and/or anti-social, can be 
considered rational for a utility-maximizer to do. Because of this, discussions of social 
dimensions can muddy the waters between what is and what is not an irrational act, and although 
we are looking for irrational acts in this chapter when trying to decide the behavioral problems in 
public housing, we can wave the stringency of that requirement somewhat for this section. A 
great number of actions may be individually utility-maximizing, but harmful to the community 
as a whole. Thus, when looking from the community perspective, interventions can still be used 
to create pro-social behavior.   
 Many of the leading hypothesis as to what causal mechanisms are driving negative 
neighborhood effects as seen in high poverty concentration neighborhoods, like those much of 
public housing is located in, revolve around social dimensions. Many of the relevant hypothesis 
for how neighborhood effects work are examples of the concepts of social norming, social proof, 
and herd mentality.232 These concepts are about social signaling which conveys “appropriate” 
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behavior or behavior which will align an individual to be more in conformity with the group. 
Sometimes choices to act in a certain way are made in conformity with the group but against 
personal interests and desires. These social forces are rooted in the individual’s desire to fit in to 
a group, even if sometimes doing so is not the behavior that would be taken by a rational actor. 
Additionally, “social cohesion” models of neighborhood effects show that the degree of social 
disorder in a neighborhood influences resident’s psychological state and behaviors (Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Earls, 1999).233 In the US, all of these hypothesized effects have been found to 
have empirical backing in research. The effect is non-linear, but neighborhood poverty rates are 
consistently related to a number of negative outcomes through the influence of peers, role 
models, and social norms. As discussed in Chapter 5, areas of high poverty concentration have 
consistently been found to have weaker social coherence and thus weaker informal social 
controls in the neighborhood. This helps add to some negative factors found in poor 
neighborhoods like heightened mental health problems and higher levels of crime. Sadly, overall 
the positive influence seen from positive neighborhoods has been much smaller than the negative 
influence seen from negative neighborhoods. This is perhaps because although positive 
neighborhoods have been shown to provide some positive externalities, like safety, there is 
typically limited social network mixing across different income levels and races.234  
Self-Integrity & Self-Affirmation 
 Self-perception, how we see ourselves and how we want to be seen can shape our actions 
in ways largely unaccounted for in a rational actor model. An individual’s desire to, “protect and 
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maintain their perceived self-integrity,” will often do so though self-regulation, self-surveillance, 
and self-scrutiny (Steele, 1988; Sweetman, 2003; Adams, et al., 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 
2006).235  Additionally, many in poverty feel what has been called a “moral tax,” in which the 
poor can sometime feel like they are morally worse just because they are poor.236 This is 
perpetuated by the “broken window” effect in which physical environment can shape perceptions 
of one’s self and one’s community.237 A lack of business investment in an area can create the 
impression that the area and its people are unimportant to powerful corporations and 
governments. Additionally, sometimes obsessive measures at fraud prevention and control for 
public benefits like drug screenings, mandatory classes, and excessive bureaucratic hoops to 
jump through can feel condescending and an unproductive waste of the person’s scarce time and 
cognitive bandwidth. These are just a few of the many examples of the ways in which the poor 
are constantly judged and treated like their economic scarcity is a symptom of deep character 
flaws and immorality. See Batty & Flint, 2010 for a full review of the literature of self-esteem 
and its effects on poverty.238  
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 These “moral taxes” in combination with the desire to avoid the threats of stigmas and 
stereotypes can motivate certain actions (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997).239 Stereotypes 
can do more than just make people feel stigmatized; they can have a direct effect on 
performance. A famous example of this is a study in which different groups of Asian women 
who took math tests were primed either to think about their Asian identity (stereotyped with 
higher quantitative ability) or their female identity (stereotyped with lower quantitative ability). 
Those in the first group performed better on the test than did a control group, while those in the 
latter group performed worse (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).240 Class-based stereotypes can 
impact individuals in the same way that race and gender stereotypes can (Croizet & Claire, 
1998).241 Thus, the perpetuation of stereotypes about individuals can have a real effect on the 
actions of these individuals who are liable to begin believing these stereotypes themselves. For 
instance, public assistance is shown to have a strong stigma attached to it, and part of the reason 
for a relatively low take-up rate for public assistance is ascribed to the potential shame and 
embarrassment of being in the program (Kissane, 2003; Hernanz, Malherbet, & Pellizzari, 
2004).242 This stigma may also reduce collective social capital in poor neighborhood, as stigma 
causes lessened interactions between fellow public assistance recipients (Lin & Harris, 2009).243 
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People want to pursue actions that further their self-integrity. They act in ways which will 
help build this kind of personal capital, even if it costs them in other areas of their lives. 
Fortunately, these effects can be countered, and positive effects can be had in the same way that 
the female Asian test subjects who were primed to think about their good math skills, performed 
better than an unprimed control group. These are called, “affirmation-interventions” (Cohen, 
Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006).244 They include simple but intentional interventions like subtly 
reinforcing positive characteristics and identities; using language intentionally meant to not 
frame the poor as lesser or separate; and displaying clear paths and examples of how people 
coming from a poor background can still achieve educational and financial success.245   
Other Effects Sometimes Occurring  
 An entire book could be dedicated to the dozens of other biases and nudges impacting 
residents in public housing. The above paragraphs have attempted to discuss the biases and 
heuristics unique to this situation, but many other factors are at play. After-all, in additional to 
whatever irrational behavioral factors are uniquely present in public housing and poverty, 
residents are still subject to all the normal biases and heuristics to which all people are subject. 
Outlined here are some additional factors that may have an increased effect in high poverty 
environments.  
Inertia and status-quo bias was mentioned earlier in the paper in Chapter 2 and in 
discussion of the scarcity mindset in this chapter. While this is one of the more obvious biases, it 
is also one of the most powerful and omnipresent. Inertia can potentially explain why many 
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changes do not happen and more importantly why opportunities for change are not always taken 
advantage of. Voucher holders, for instance, do not always take the opportunity to relocate to 
nicer neighborhoods, even when the option is available. Over-optimism is also an obvious but 
powerful behavioral factor. All individuals overestimate their future selves and future ability to 
do things like pay back loans taken out. Unfortunately, the lower margin of error in poverty can 
make over-optimism a dangerous effect. 
Perceived fairness is an interesting social factor not thoroughly discussed earlier. 
Individuals have a strong inclination toward fairness. We expect it from others and are inclined 
to practice it ourselves. 246 The flip side of this effect is that if we feel unfairness, we will act in 
ways seen as irrational to reconcile this. If individuals feel like they have been unfairly dealt 
with, they may be inclined to be less pro-social. Fairness concerns may also impact trust, a pillar 
so critical to daily interaction that heightened concerns about trust can lead to worse economic 
outcomes (Orbell & Dawes, 1991, 1993).247 Concerns of trust have been shown to be more 
present for those in poverty, presumably because they have to deal with an environment with less 
social cohesion, less formal oversight, and more of a possibility of crime occurring (Hall, 
2008).248 Different levels of law abidingness and trust in authorities are shown to differ by 
socioeconomic class, and these class differences have been linked to levels of institutional trust 
(Tyler, 2001a; Tyler, 2001b). Levels of lower institutional trust may make those in high poverty 
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likely to associate with institutions even when these institutions may be “rationally” 
beneficial.249  
Conclusion 
 The problems seen in public housing can be overall described as problems emanating 
from several root cause problems: poverty, PHAs’ lack of resources, and negative neighborhood 
effects. As figure 6.1 shows, the causes of all these problems are not all related to behavioral 
irrationalities, but as our discussion in this chapter shows, a surprising amount of these problems 
may be. Recent research into the “scarcity” mindset explains why poverty can be so mentally 
debilitating, looking at social dimensions of irrational behavior can reveal some of the 
hypothesized causal mechanisms of neighborhood effects, and a focus on an individual’s 
premium placed on self-integrity can explain behaviors like not applying for critical public 
assistance. These biases and heuristics, combined with the litany of other behavioral factors 
people are subject to, helps show some of the irrational behavioral problems in public housing. 
The next chapter, Chapter 7, will explore potential behavioral interventions that can be used 
within the context of public housing to counter Chapter 6’s behavioral problems.  
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CHAPTER 7:  
BEHAVIORAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC HOUSING     
The focus of behavioral economics is at the hyper-specific level, so it can be difficult to 
imagine tackling large and imprecise problems, as are found in public housing, with single 
interventions. Behavioral economics relies on extensive experimentation and attention to context 
to work, so problems in which the specific, local, behavioral irrationalities can be pinpointed are 
ideal for change. For instance, if it was found that public housing residents weren’t reporting 
crimes because the reporting system was too cumbersome, that would be a problem ideal for 
behavioral intervention. There are certain types of problems which behavioral economics has had 
the most success with, as Chapters 2 and 3 discussed.  
As Chapters 5 and 6 covered, causal mechanisms behind many of the problems in public 
housings are still exceptionally questionable. Resultantly these interventions are sometimes 
inexact in what behavioral casual mechanism they are targeting. It would be ideal if researchers 
could clearly just slice the problems into clearly delineated causes, and for those which are 
related to “irrational” behaviors design some intervention, but neither our understanding of the 
causes of problems nor our comprehension of all the irrationalities of the human mind are 
adequate for such precision. Instead, we currently have a host of proposed causal behavioral 
mechanism which may or may not be in play for any certain problem. 
In lieu of complete information on the type and extent of behavioral problems in public 
housing, this paper will proceed with its patchwork of recognized problems. By connecting the 
broad problems of public housing to potential and likely underlying behavioral problems, this 
paper can proceed to connect these behavioral problems to potential behavioral solutions in the 
form of behavioral interventions. Neither this paper nor behavioral economics proposes to “fix” 
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all the problems present in public housing, but a closer attentiveness to certain administrative 
elements of public housing promises marginal improvements at little cost. 
Behavioral Approaches to Countering Poverty 
 Long-term approaches to countering problems in public housing must look at wider 
poverty-fighting policies if they are to have a significant impact on the lives of public housing 
residents. While the interventions listed in this report are those which can be implemented in or 
through public housing by a public housing authority and supporting agencies and non-profits, 
there are a number of broader behavioral interventions that have been used to fight the problems 
seen in poverty. This latter set of intervention can have a significant impact on public housing 
residents, and should be part of any well-designed set of behavioral interventions. 
Behavioral economics practitioner groups have designed models through which poverty 
can holistically be combatted. Housing plays a large part of these approaches since it is the 
environment with which impoverished individuals interact with most often, but a fully-
behaviorally informed approach to poverty must include more than that. While these holistic 
models are out of the immediate scope of this paper, a few will be covered here shortly to give 
perspective into what these interventions would look like and require.  
The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) suggests that combatting poverty is best done 
through a three-prong strategy of minimizing costs, maximizing resources, and preventing 
intergenerational poverty. Here one of the main things policymakers should be considerate of in 
their intervention is minimizing the bandwidth cost to people engaging with the government. BIT 
also suggests that there is a set of resources which contribute to an individual’s chances of 
escaping poverty, referred to as different type of “capital” which must be accumulated. These 
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include: economic capital (income and wealth), human capital (education and work), 
environmental capital (housing and neighborhood), social capital (social networks and social 
trust), character capital (self-control and self-efficacy), and cognitive capital (mental bandwidth 
and freedom from behavioral biases).250 Although all these have been discussed at some point in 
this paper, viewing these different aspects as types of capital to be gained is helpful to 
policymakers trying to be comprehensive and exhaustive in their efforts to combat poverty. BIT 
notes that, as this paper also has, there are various interactions between these different forms of 
capital that create both vicious and virtuous cycles. For example, through neighborhood effects, 
the areas in which one lives can affect the development of a number of different types of capital. 
Anti-poverty interventions must take account for these in planning out what policies to do when, 
as some types of capital can act prerequisite to the advanced development of others.  
Ideas42, an academic-oriented non-profit that works with governments, businesses, 
foundations, and other non-governmental actors to implement behavioral economics, emphasizes 
that the key to fighting chronic scarcity lies in cutting the costs of poverty, creating slack to 
allow for adjustment to unanticipated shocks, and to instill in people a belief that they can escape 
the circumstances of poverty.251 The non-profit, which includes a number of famous behavioral 
economists including Mullainathan and Shafir as advisors, emphasizes the shortcomings of 
traditional “rational-actor” approaches to poverty. Instead they urge a behavioral approach. For 
example, rather than humans being driven by stable preferences and values, Ideas42 views 
behavior as driven by preferences which vary over time and context. Instead of asking what 
                                                 
250 Behavioural Insights Team. "Poverty and Decision-Making: How Behavioral Science can Improve Opportunity 
in the UK." Nesta. October 2016. 
251 Supra. Note 186. 
Sellers 116 
 
people in poverty are doing wrong, they emphasize asking what poverty is doing to people to 
cause them to do things wrong.252  
Behavioral Interventions Within Public Housing 
Simplify Processes in Public Housing 
Intervention 1: Create a “Common Application” for Resident Programs 
The simplification of forms and services is a consistent area of behavioral economic 
success. This is especially important in light of the recognition of limited cognitive bandwidth 
and the tunneling effect it produces. These interventions also counter the problem of friction 
costs, in which small, seemingly unimportant barriers like complex forms, may deter individuals 
from taking actions even when they recognize these actions are in their best interests. Take the 
documentation required to enroll in many benefit programs. For residents with limited 
bandwidth, the number and breadth of documents required can be unnecessarily high. In New 
York, for example, an applicant to receive food stamps can be asked to provide up to 25 different 
documents to verify income and situation including school records, a car dealer’s appraisal of a 
vehicle, and utility bills.253 Keeping track of all this documentation and clearing up any errors is 
a burdensome task for any person, but for low-income individuals it can be especially hard. Add 
on the that the obligation to update your information for some of these programs annually to 
account for changes in living situation, and this process is made even more confusing. Instability  
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Figure 7.1 The First Half of Page One Out of Five Pages of “Eligibility Factors” and Documentation 
Required. 
is innate to the lives of those in poverty. Income levels and benefits earned can change 
substantially each year as jobs are gained and lost, family members residing in the same 
residence shift, and different benefit programs phase in or out. 
Instability in people’s lives can mean lost or unobtained records. Combine that with 
existing bandwidth constraints, and the costs of assembling this documentation becomes 
magnified. Keep in mind that a high percentage of those in public housing are single mothers, 
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disabled, or elderly, so finding help when it is needed and arranging trips to the various offices 
administering public assistance can be unnecessarily difficult. Residents are potentially 
completing paperwork for a number of different benefit programs: TANF, food stamps (SNAP), 
housing assistance, disability, elderly supplemental security, etc. Ideas42 suggests that the 
burden brought by these processes could be substantially reduced by have a sort of “Common 
Application” similar in style to that which is used by many American universities. This would 
save time, energy, and critical bandwidth by reducing the number of different application which 
need to be filled out.254 Since so much of this information needed is the same across the different 
applications, common types of information must only be input and proven once. Like with the 
college common application, if certain programs need additional information, the application can 
consolidate all the extra necessary requirements in one place. Residents can then fill these 
remaining requirements.  
While simplifying which documents are really needed and lightening the burden on how 
often these forms need to be updated would likely prove efficacious, the ability to make this kind 
of a decision is not always available at the local level. To that point, the ability to make a 
common application for all benefit programs would require state and federal level approval. 
Fortunately, in programs run and administered by PHAs and other local groups there is more 
discretion. PHAs and connected non-profits often offer a number of different connected support 
programs ranging from childcare to job training. For these types of programs, a common 
application and other simplification strategies could be implemented at a more localized level 
over programs for which these groups have jurisdiction. This will obviously not be as effective 
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as the alternative of a universal common application, but until that kind of a system can be 
created, this is the available low-hanging fruit. 
Intervention 2: Use Technology to Consolidate Records and Prepopulate Fields 
 As mentioned in the section above, those in poverty are forced to keep up with dozens of 
different records, many of which require annual updates, to qualify for public benefits. A 
relatively simply technology could be used to help residents keep track of all their forms in one 
consolidated place. PHAs can provide residents with a software program which allows all 
documents to be scanned and recorded in one place. Admittedly, this is essentially just a 
glorified digital folder with some security protection and a number of companies already provide 
this type of service, but that is the appeal of behavioral interventions. Doing small, easy things 
can make marginal improvements of outcomes by correcting for irrational behavior. The 
behavioral impact here would be a reduction of friction and bandwidth costs. A number of 
different improvements could be tacked on to existing systems. There could be an autofill 
function similar to that had in many internet browsers in which the software can detect what each 
piece of information means and automatically provide it when filling out forms or applications 
online.255 Another potential feature could help residents manage updates that must be made to 
relevant forms by tracking when what updates need to be made where and highlighting or 
sending a notification to residents about each required update.  
PHAs can provide the software and any required equipment like scanners. They can even 
house the digitized records for residents who do not have a computer. Since residents will likely 
need to hold on to the original copies of these forms, PHAs could also play a role in storing 
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forms for people in orderly locked filing cabinets to prevent loss or theft and the resultant 
potential identity fraud. Ultimately, this latter idea of physically storing resident’s documentation 
might prove inefficient or infeasible, but small, easy to arrange interventions like this one ought 
to be constantly tried.  
Improve Communications Between Residents and PHAs and Related Group 
Intervention 1: Try to Use “Behavioral” Elements in Communications 
 
 Behavioral economics has a number of different insights into how communications with 
residents can be improved. Everything about important forms and notices going to residents 
should be considered, as seemingly trivial details like wording, different types of appeals (ethos, 
pathos, and logos), and method of delivery may influence how residents respond to these 
communications. Letters designed to take advantage of behavioral factors were shown to be even 
more effective than small financial incentives at times.256  
Housing authorities should avoid information overload, and apply simplification 
principles when possible through additions like highlighting all the most pertinent information at 
the top of a letter, and providing the details and fine print after. If a choice needs to be made, it is 
best to provide residents with a decision tree framework through which they can easier make the 
optimal choice. Figure 7.2 provides an example of a decision tree framework in the context of 
trying to explain to researchers what statistical test to use. In the context of public housing, a 
similar choice map graphic which identities certain qualities of the resident, then provides 
suggested options based on the resident’s situation can convey information quickly and easily. 
                                                 





This would take the frame of something like “if income is greater an x, look at option branch 1; 
if income is lower than x, look at branch 2.”  
 
Figure 7.2 Example of a Decision Tree Used to Map Out Choices. PHAs Could Provide Residents 
with These Kinds of Choice Mappings to Help Them Decide the Optimal Choice for Their Situation.  
PHAs should take care to broadcast positive messages rather than negative ones to avoid 
the unintended consequences of making bad actions seem normal. For example, broadcasting 
widespread failures in an effort to get residents to change whatever behavior is contributing to 
the failures may only have the effect of worsening those failures due to negative social norming. 
Thus, if, for example, residents are not properly disposing of trash or parking in proper spots, an 
email or letter advising residents to start doing these things because most others are not may only 
backfire. Rather than having the intended effect of “guilting” residents into starting to do these 
things correctly, this may only reinforce the notion that most people are not disposing their trash 
or parking correctly, so it is unimportant if I as an individual do these things.257 Rather, messages 
ought to focus on good actions which all other residents are doing, or bad actions which all other 
residents are avoiding. Additionally, broadcasting negative messages can reinforce negative 
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stereotypes and stigmas which undermines resident’s view of their neighborhood and 
themselves. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a payment, but the focus is on 
the fact that residents earned this credit by working, not on the fact that it is in place to help low-
income families.258 Positive messages on the other hand can take advantage of the behavioral 
nudge of “priming,” in which just by cueing someone to think about a certain aspect of 
themselves, this person’s behavior can be changed. Studies have found that encouraging people 
to reflect on proud moments as parents, students, and/or employees can improve cognitive 
performance and increase ones willingness to participate in social programs (Hall, Shafir, & 
Zhao, 2014).259 Ideas42 points out that priming can even have a positive impact on government 
staff in that priming staff of these groups to think about their identities as “public servants or 
compassionate individuals” made these employees more likely to act “in accordance with this 
image of themselves.” 260  
Intervention 2: Focus on Channel Factors to Provide Better Notification 
 Channel factors, mentioned in this paper’s opening, are stimuli which influence the 
progress of an individual toward some outcome. For example, specific plans in terms of setting a 
time and date to so something improves the likeliness that person will actually follow through on 
doing that thing. Voter turnout, for example, could be increased by 4.1% (9.1% among single-
eligible voter households) by forming a voting plan (Nickerson & Rodgers, 2010).261 PHAs 
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should take advantage of this when they need to motivate residents to take some action like 
visiting a certain office or healthcare professional.  
Residents in some complexes complain that although many assistance programs and 
opportunities for employment and education are advertised, they are done so passively and 
without much attention to medium or timing. Letters may be sent out months before the deadline 
and emails may be sent as part of larger resident newsletters. According to residents, one has to 
be aware that such opportunities exist and then continuously be on the lookout if one hopes to 
take advantage of them. Effective channel factors can better present these opportunities. 
Employees of PHAs or other agencies will often visit homes in many PHAs to do inspection or 
provide some other services to residents.262 This is a prime opportunity to make use of this 
interaction. Visiting employees can verbally tell the resident about an upcoming opportunity and 
provide something to them (a fridge magnet or simplified flyer) that reminds them of due dates 
and other relevant information. Each interaction between residents and employees is an 
opportunity to directly convey information, so this chance should not be missed.  
Most official notices, especially those related to rent, utilities, and other financially 
related information, is sent via the traditional mail. Especially for residents of public housing 
who are prone to having outdated addresses and other problems receiving mail, these messages 
can frequently be overlooked or missed.263 Fortunately, technology has proliferated to the point 
where most residents can be more easily contacted through other means. A survey of low-income 
individuals in New York revealed that 87% of them use a smartphone, and that these resident’s 
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preferred method of communication was text.264 By providing text alerts and automated phone 
messages for important things related to payments or other opportunities clearer communication 
can be had. The high number of smartphones also opens up the possibility of other technological 
interventions that are based on behavioral science. Applications can be extremely helpful for 
behavioral strategies of simplification and leveraging channel factors, so PHAs should explore 
the possibility of releasing such technologies should a need be found. 
Intervention 3: Send Text Reminders to Avoid Costly Missed Appointments 
 Certain public housing units in the United Kingdom and in the United States struggle 
with residents missing appointments.265 Seemingly most prolific were appointments made 
between maintenance-people and residents. Maintenance-people would show up only to not be 
able to contact the resident. Given the limited bandwidth of those in poverty, and the lack of 
immediacy of many repairs, residents can be liable to not pay much attention to scheduled repair 
dates and times. There also may not have been a direct penalty to the individual for missed times, 
lessening their incentive to stick to formerly set times. Regardless of the reason for missed 
appointments, these harmless mistakes were costly because many maintenance-people get paid a 
flat fee just for showing up to an appointment. The United Kingdom’s National Health Services 
(NHS) faced a similar issue with “did not attends” (DNAs) in which individuals scheduled a 
doctor visit, but did not come to it. BIT, tasked with solving this issue, was able to find that 
DNAs could be dramatically reduced (around 30%) by prompting patients to verbally repeat 
their scheduled time to staff and by using normative messaging to pull on the social norm that 
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almost all show up to their appointments (Martin et al; 2012).266 Applying these same practices 
to missed maintenance requests may be similarly beneficial in public housing. Interventions like 
this are scalable to number of different interactions.  
Improve the Physical and Social Environment in Public Housing 
Intervention 1: Add Murals and Other Art Projects 
 Murals and other similar public art projects done in or near public housing have the 
potential to increase pro-social behavior, bolster resident’s sense of attachment to their homes, 
and reduce petty crimes like vandalism. As an example of the effect negative social norming can 
have, researchers have found that graffiti, litter, and other small signs of violations of norms and 
laws can encourage others to also violate norms and laws.267 Additionally, vandalism costs 
governments hundreds of millions a year to repair and replace damaged property.268 Per incident 
costs of graffiti removal alone can be around $400, and even small cities like Oceanside, 
California end up budgeting hundreds of thousands of dollars to graffiti removal alone.269 
Murals, if painted in high vandalism areas, have the potential to reduce some of this cost and 
potentially provoke positive feelings.270 For example, in London, Ogilvy change, a behavioral 
interventions-focus marketing agency, painted blue babies faces on shops which had been 
vandalized in rioting in Greenwich Borough. The firm had found evidence that the color blue 
lent a calming effect and that babies faces promoted a more pro-social caring response in those 
who saw the mural. As a result of the paintings, antisocial behavior dropped by nearly a 
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quarter.271 Several other cities have already begun the use of murals on schools and different 
public areas.272 New York City has recently even allocated money for murals to be painted in 
public housing (see figure 7.5).273 The Mural Arts Program (MAP), a project in the poverty-
stricken parts of Philadelphia, went even further (see figures 7.3 and 7.4). For two years, a 
combination of Dutch artists brought in by MAP and locals these artists trained transformed an 
entire run-down city block into a street covered in a smattering of upbeat colors in a northern 
Philadelphia neighborhood. Subsequent projects like these have since transformed other sections 
of Philadelphia in a similar way. 
 
Figure 7.3 Painting by MAP in North Philadelphia274  
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Figure 7.4 Another Painting by MAP in North Philadelphia275 
Projects like these shape resident and public perception about a neighborhood from being 
dangerous and crime-ridden to artistic and exciting. Community art has been shown to improve 
individual’s sense of well-being, social connectedness, and resilience.276 This acts counters the 
stereotype threat in which perceptions help shape reality, and it strengths the force of self-
affirmation discussed in the prior chapter. 
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Figure 7.5 New York City Public Housing Mural277 
In response to these same factors, certain cities including Dallas, Denver, and Chicago 
have tried to use public graffiti walls, specifically designated to be painted on as a tool to reduce 
graffiti elsewhere.278 These walls, dubbed “permission walls,” are thought to give potential  
 
Figure 7.6 Denver “Permission Wall”279 
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graffiti artists an outlet through which they can express themselves legally, rather than having to 
illegally vandalize property (see figure 7.6). While certain anecdotal local successes have been 
reported with this strategy, no cities on record have proven permission walls to be effective 
crime or graffiti deterrents. Perhaps counterintuitively, some cities have actually reported an 
increase in graffiti in the surrounding area, likely due to some kind of norming effect.280 That 
said, some have reported that permission walls build a community’s pride in an area or have 
other effects like drawing in visitors who then spend money in nearby stores.281 Permission walls 
are an excellent example of how behavioral interventions must be tested and results monitored in 
each new context because counter-intuitive results do occur. Sometimes good-natured 
interventions can backfire if they are new ideas or old ideas applied in new settings. 
Intervention 2: Add Physical Interventions to Elicit Community  
 Some public housing complexes have a strong sense of community, but many distressed 
complexes do not. Much of this is linked in a lack of social cohesion and trust. Positive social 
capital is a boon to a neighborhood because it increases pro-social behavior, positive reciprocity, 
and stronger informal social controls. In the past, public spaces like common areas and 
playgrounds were used to attempt to socialize residents, but many of these spaces became run 
down or too dangerous due to gang violence or drug dealing.282 When possible PHAs should 
attempt to connect residents through community events and other gathering, but this is 
inadvisable in many distressed complexes with high rates of crime. Subtle interventions may be 
able to make residents feel more socially connected. Digital interventions seem available and 
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fairly easy to implement. For example, some public housing units have community Facebook 
pages or other message boards through which residents can interact.283 Physical changes to make 
residents feel more connected are harder, but many different things may be tried across different 
housing complexes. For example, for complexes with indoor hallways, hanging a framed photo 
of each family on or near their door may make residents feel more familiar with their neighbors. 
In the same vein, cork boards or similar posting boards can be added outside of rooms to allow 
residents to personalize their image to their neighbors by hanging more pictures, quotes, verses, 
decorations, or anything else near to them. This solution does have a high risk of backfiring if 
these boards or pictures are vandalized, and it would likely work best in complexes in which 
residents are all are nearly all elderly. For complexes with units opening to the outside, small 
front-yard spaces, sectioned off for each residence would allow small plants and flowers to be 
grown. This is something which many public housing complexes, build after and in response to 
the notorious public high-rises of Chicago, New York, and St. Louis, did try to include. Since 
demographics vary so largely between different complexes, the results of these interventions 
may vary widely. 
Intervention 3: Encourage Self-Affirmation Through Resident Social Solidarity Groups 
 Groups of residents meeting to share and discuss the mutual problems they are facing has 
the potential to provide residents with a mutual support network, build social cohesion, and act 
as a force for self-affirmation for each individual involved. This may sound like a naïve, “after-
school special”, feel-good approach, with little chance of actual success, but there is significant 
evidence of the power of priming through self-affirmation in environments where stereotype 
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threats are present. Affirmation of one’s self and place in the world is important to people’s 
cognitive capacity. An experiment in a New Jersey soup kitchen asked individuals to privately 
share a story about a “proud moment or past achievement” before taking a problem-solving test. 
Compared to individuals who only shared a story about their daily routine, the former 
“affirmation” group did better on the test (by the equivalent of a 10-point increase in IQ) and 
were more likely to accept information of government financial assistance when told they might 
be eligible (Hall, Zhao, & Shafir, 2014).284 The same effect was not found for higher-income 
individuals when a similar test was run on them. This study is not an isolated finding. 
“Affirmation-interviews,” have also been found to lessen the race achievement gap in high 
schools (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006).285 Encouraging people to remember and focus 
on their values can improve the performance on tasks and tests for poor and minority candidates 
especially (Harackiewicz et al., 2014; The Behavioural Insights Team, 2015b).286 And 
individuals who showed an internal locus of control (i.e., individuals who believe that outcomes 
depended primarily on their own efforts), searched harder in experiments mimicking job search 
behavior than those with an external locus of control (i.e., individuals who believe that outcomes 
are primarily matters of fate and chance) (McGee & McGee, 2015).287 All this is not to say that a 
good pep-talk can cure poverty and that people can always successfully pull themselves up by 
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their own bootstraps, but it is important to recognize that attitude and self-esteem can actually 
impact outcomes and demonstrated cognitive ability.288 
This may not work at all complexes or among all age and gender groups. Different 
interventions ought to be tried with different mixes of demographics. For example, attempt all-
male/all-female groups versus mixed gender groups. Also attempt all of a certain age group 
versus mixes of age groups. PHAs could also attempt to build groups based on identities 
residents may feel strongly attached to such as “parent”, “struggling with a disability”, or 
“pursuing higher education” to build trust within these solidarity groups. Residents certainly 
should not be defined by one-dimensional descriptions, but there is an opportunity where shared 
experiences might serve to connect strangers.  
Intervention 4: Allow Stable Residents Who Surpass the “Above-Income” Threshold the Option 
to Remain in Public Housing for a Phase Out Period 
 Public housing’s incentives for rational actors are not especially effective. Residents pay 
a maximum of 30% of their income as rent, and if residents go over a certain threshold (above 
80% of local area median income), they are forced to leave public housing entirely. These kinds 
of incentives certainly do matter, but they are not the focus of this paper which seeks to look 
only at irrational behavior-related causes of problems in public housing. Behavioral economics 
does not reject that rational actor incentives exist, it merely suggests that they do not work 
perfectly and are sometimes influenced by other biases and heuristics.   
 The behavioral importance of kicking out “above-income” households is that these 
families or individuals can be sources of social stability for public housing complexes. These 
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households effectively can make public housing units “mixed income” in an organic fashion. 
One of the major shortcoming of mixed income complexes is that strong ties often do not 
develop between residents of different racial or class statuses to allow low-income individuals to 
reap some kind of social capital benefit. With this proposed arrangement, existing resident who 
have become higher-income, who presumably already have ties to a neighborhood can remain in 
an area to stabilize and benefit it. Some PHAs have already adopted lenient stances in letting 
above-income residents stay put, since these households are financially beneficial to the PHAs 
bottom line. In 2015 HUD estimates that some 25,226 above-income families resided in public 
housing (2.6% of all public housing residents).289 The majority of these residents are not making 
more than $10,000 over the threshold, and HUD contends that these residents do not require 
subsidies and are reducing program costs by $116 million annually. Some proposals in Congress 
would create a phase-out period through which households which have become “above income” 
can stay put until earning more than 120% of median area income, then these households must 
move out or begin paying market rent.290 Solutions like this can help to deconcentrate poverty, 
but since there is already a waitlist for many public housing residences, additional support 
(perhaps from the reduced HUD program costs) would need to be allocated to other housing 
solutions. 
Intervention 5: Involve Respected Authority Figures in Policing Public Housing 
 Behavioral economics and marketing tell us that the messenger behind a product matters. 
Companies pay professional athletes fortunes to endorse their products, not out of the kindness 
of their hearts, but as part of a profit motive. Of course, it always remains to be seen how 
                                                 




effective a particular messenger will be in a particular circumstance. It might be intuitive that an 
athlete endorsing a sports drink will improve consumer perception of that drink and thus one’s 
inclination to buy it, but does a celebrity’s endorsement of a brand of toilet paper makes us want 
to buy that product more? In this circumstance perhaps our own mother’s endorsement of a toilet 
paper brand would compel us more in a way that our mother’s endorsement of a sports drink 
would not. Circumstance matters, so it is important to understand what messengers might 
generate the best response when. There is strong evidence that messages coming from close 
personal relationships can be used to reduce criminal activity (Sampson & Laub, 1993).291 
Operation Ceasefire, a program aimed to reduce youth gun violence in American cities like 
Boston and Cincinnati did this in part by using mothers to deliver messages to gang member. 
BIT, in looking to replicate the program for Scotland Yard, suggested the practice of having 
local mothers join the police on the beat in distress public housing units and other high poverty 
neighborhoods, to add to the credibility to the police.292 Adding a local authority figure and a 
governmental authority figure in this way may improve the strength of both messages. These 
kinds of social norm shaping behaviors ought to be pursued more in public housing. The more 
residents can be brought in the shape a pro-social message in neighborhoods the better. 
Heighten PHA Accountability and Accessibility 
Intervention 1: PHAs Hold Different Hours to Accommodate Resident and Applicant’s Work and 
Education Schedules 
 
 Many PHAs hold hours standard to most businesses in the United States: Monday to 
Friday 9am-5pm. While this makes sense for PHA employees, it hurts working residents and 
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those who desire to get jobs, as those hours are the most common in the work week. Many low-
income jobs do not come with the considerable flexibility needed to take off in the middle of the 
workday to handle matters that would require going to the PHA office. Instead PHAs should 
adjust their hours to make them more accommodating to their residents. PHAs can still be open 
for a collective 40 hours, to avoid excessive costs like overtime pay, but they might decide to, for 
example, start opening one hour later each day and offer five hours on the weekend. Many 
different potential new schedules can be made, but the way to optimize operating hours is by 
keeping record of the busiest and least busy times and making hour adjustments accordingly. 
This same intervention has already been done at many other offices which assist low-income 
individuals, helping to reduce the bandwidth tax that comes with trying to find a way to get to 
these offices during open hours.293  
Intervention 2: Create an Easy to Use 3-1-1 Reporting System 
 Residents have as much, if not more, of an interest in keeping public housing units clean 
and well-maintained as anyone. Unfortunately, they do not always have an easy way to go about 
conveying problems they have noticed to PHAs. Residents are the ones who spot all nature of 
problems in public housing, from leaky roofs and broken door handles to drug dealing and 
incidents of domestic violence. Establishing clear and hassle-free communication channels to 
PHAs and other local authorities is the first step in getting public housing residents involved in 
creating well-maintained and pro-social housing complexes. Part of this is solving for a problem 
of information asymmetry, but in a perfectly rational world, residents who would gain by seeing 
a problem go away would likely report it regardless of communication channel. Another part of 
this is a public good problem, in that the maintenance of safe public spaces at the neighborhood 
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level is not the individual’s main objective. Still a greater part of this probably lies in the hassle 
of reporting incidents after they are noticed. A resident might see a problem when coming home 
from work in the evening, but later forget about it or find it too much of a hassle to go to the 
PHA’s offices the next day. If the PHA’s offices are off-site, which is often the case, there is 
even less of a chance that a problem is reported. Contacting PHAs can be difficult, as they are 
often overwhelmed by callers and visitors, so emails and calls may go unanswered. Instead, 
PHAs should try to produce a text-in or webpage system which allows for residents to report 
non-emergency 3-1-1 incidents right away when they witness them. Ideally an identical system 
could be created for simplified maintenance requests too. The system would need to balance 
simplicity with flexibility, allowing reports to be simple and easy to do but all-encompassing in 
that all reports can go through one system. Still, there remains in many public housing 
communities a problem of institutional trust, which also likely inhibits reporting. Additional 
steps (including some behavioral interventions) need to be taken to maximize the efficacy of this 
kind of a solution. The next intervention will discuss one way to potentially do this. 
Intervention 3: Create a “Pizza-Tracker” Type Portal Showing Progress of Repairs, 
Applications, and Other Responses 
 Behavioral economics type approaches may be newer to the policy realm, but long before 
behavioral economics became more codified and specific, it saw usage by the marketing 
business. Oftentimes still, policy makers may be able to take inspiration from marketing 
practices. Harvard Business School professor Michael Norton talks about the Dominos’ “Pizza 
Tracker” for example. This piece of minor technology was able to build customer trust and thus 
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loyalty, even though customers are not really getting any new information.294 More practically, it 
also gave people peace of mind and informed customers of when their pizza was in progress, 
reducing calls from concerned customers. To quote Norton, “There is something very 
psychologically compelling about having the feeling that [the pizza creation] is happening…in 
particular this feeling that someone is working for you…it means we’re really important and the 
more we can see the process…the more we feel really good about that process.” PHAs should 
opt to create a similar system in which residents can track their requests submitted with the 
  
Figure 7.7 Current “Pizza Tracker” that PHAs Can Design a “Request Tracker” After 
PHA for various things including maintenance requests, applications for various affiliate 
programs, and potentially even 3-1-1 requests for various non-emergency services around the 
housing complex like fixing a street light or filling a pothole in the parking lot. Each “tracker” 
could be semi-customized to show the exact stages through which a resident’s request will go, 
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and time estimates for completion of each stage can be given. Once the service is completed, 
residents can rate the quality of the work and responsiveness of the staff. PHAs could collect 
data on timeliness of completion and resident satisfaction. This is the idea for the simplest 
version of the tracker, but a number of different add-ons could be made. Contact information of 
relevant parties at each stage could be provided, so residents know who to contact if necessary, 
and they see more of a personal connection to whatever party is handling the request. Providing a 
specific name and picture of an individual, rather than just an office would make this especially 
effective. Residents could add comments at each stage if some aspect of their requests is updated 
or needs further commentary. PHAs and other servicing parties connected to the requests could 
also add commentary to detail the steps being taken. Residents could connect to the tracker 
through their mobile phones or computer. It has the advantage of building on a system already 
well known to most consumers—the pizza tracker—meaning that chances of confusion about the 
technology are lessened. Importantly, if PHAs adopt this system, they absolutely must keep it 
updated and operative, or the tracker loses all its effectiveness and residents will not bother to 
deal with it. If done right, this has the potential to assuage resident’s concerns, create a clearer 
channel of communication between residents and government, and increase PHA accountability. 
 The hope is that this intervention, small though it may be, will make residents feel like 
they are having their concerns listened to, and PHAs will gain more of their trust and goodwill. 
Behavioral economics would suggest that this may lead to increased reciprocity, in which 
residents will begin to take more of an interest in cooperating with the PHA and other local 
officials. Additionally, residents will may start to take more of an interest in seeing repairs and 
other improvements happen if they can see signs of actual progress rather than just emailing a 
large, unresponsive, faceless agency. In the long run, the improved service of the tracker could 
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also help combat social stigma and the image that poor neighborhoods are not worth taking care 
of. 
Intervention 4: Have PHAs Pay Residents a Small Amount for Slow Responses 
 Another way to gain trust from residents is by ensuring them that their requests will be 
heard and taken care of by a certain date. The above intervention will help residents by allowing 
them to see the process through which requests are handled and make them feel assured in seeing 
the specific individuals handling their requests. The integrity of this tacker and the simplified 
request system is dependent on requests actually being fulfilled. Unfortunately, in many public 
housing complexes, this is an aggressive assumption. Mostly of the solutions to fix the efficiency 
of PHAs and other servicing entities lies more in changing traditional incentives and regulations, 
but some behavioral interventions may prove effective. Simply offering residents small amounts 
of money if their requests are not fulfilled on time could be a substantial motivator for PHAs, 
and make residents see PHAs are serious about helping them. This incentive system could just 
apply to personal requests like repairs made within one’s unit, or if PHAs are interested in 
further incentivizing pro-social behavior, this system could apply to some other 3-1-1 type 
requests for public good services like repairing potholes. If PHAs fulfill these requests in a 
timely manner, resident confidence will grow. The behavioral lever being pulled here is that of 
loss aversion. Losses hurt us psychologically more than gains help us. By switching the power 
dynamic here, PHAs are exposing themselves to loss, and the pains of losing money from 
already limited budgets rings larger than whatever ethereal potential gains the PHA would 
already have from fulfilling requests on time. 
Intervention 5: Have PHA and Resident BE “Ambassadors” to Help Look for Behavioral Lapses 
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 Clearly a broader point to be made in this discussion of interventions is that residents and 
employees working directly with PHAs are the most keenly aware of the small behavioral flaws 
taking place in each public housing complex. Residents can often see the gap between intentions 
of certain programs and reality. For example, maybe classes are being hosted which are not 
directly relevant enough to resident’s lives. Similarly, employees can see where residents are 
consistently failing to meet certain expectations. Perhaps residents are unintentionally not 
signing up for credit union accounts offered through public housing partners which would allow 
residents to get cheap credit. Small, micro-level behavioral problems occurring in specific public 
housing complexes may go unnoticed to even behavioral economics-minded policy makers if 
these problems have not been noticed before in public housing (as discussed in Chapter 3). Thus, 
connecting behaviorally-informed policymakers in local government to these residents and front-
line employees in some official capacity helps fill a critical information gap. This is similar to 
the way in which line-workers in manufacturing facilities are often the source of a number of 
small innovations because they can daily see what is going wrong and come up with clever 
solutions.  
 The exact method of how to connect residents and employees to city and local 
policymakers is not entirely clear, so PHAs ought to try a number of different arrangements to 
see what works best. The key is to have people at the local policy-making level who know 
behavioral economics and who are empowered to make behavioral interventions in public 
housing and other spaces. Select residents and employees can be picked and taught the basics of 
behavioral economics to understand if any of the problems they are seeing are irrational-behavior 
related. The behaviorally-informed policymakers will be there to help flesh out and vet the 
problems brought up by residents, and if a problem does appear to be the result of some irrational 
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behavior, the policymakers can design intervention. Additionally, when residents are treated as 
experts about their own problems, they are more likely to feel self-affirmation and to go along 
with resultant solution generated from discussions with policymakers.295 
Increase Savings in Public Housing 
Intervention 1: Have a Portion of Rent Late Fees Go into a Long-Term Investment Account for 
the Late-Paying Resident  
  Saving and asset accumulation was mentioned in the “Problems Seen in Public Housing” 
section of this paper because residents have crucially little in terms of assets, and most 
Americans at the level of poverty that public housing residents are in, are spending over 100% of 
their income. This means little to no savings accumulated, and without saving and investment, 
residents will have no way to earn money for retirement or other future investments like cars, 
homes, or funding for their children’s education. Present bias afflicts residents who fail to save 
because future needs seem impossibly far off. Fortunately, behavioral economics has proven 
itself as an effective way to generate savings time and again.  
 Because residents do not have a substantial amount of money saved, misallocation of 
money one month can result in late rent payments. PHAs must punish residents like any other 
landlord would for not meeting rent or else there is no incentive for residents to pay on time. At 
the same time, PHAs, unlike normal private housing, has an additional goal of helping residents 
build their lives in the hopes that they will eventually escape poverty. A balanced approach 
would punish residents, but also assist them. PHAs can strike this balance and help residents 
overcome present bias by taking half (or some other fraction) of resident’s late fees and putting 
                                                 
295 Supra., Note 186. 
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that money into a long-term investment account which residents cannot access for some long-
term duration (perhaps at least ten or more years). Residents will still feel the pain of having to 
pay late fees, but now they will have something tucked away for them in the long run. It is 
unlikely that this will incentivize residents to begin paying bills late more often now because 
some portion of their money is still lost, and the potential long-term gains are far outweighed by 
the pain of the loss of short-term loss of money that could have been spent immediately.  
Intervention 2: Provide Residents the Default Option to Pay Above 30% Rent with Whatever 
Portion Paid Above Automatically Put Into Savings for Them  
 This intervention is almost similar to the former one, but it involves a voluntary sacrifice 
of money instead of a punitive one. Residents can choose to pay more in rent, potentially 
somewhere between 31% to 35% (residents currently pay 30% of rent to PHA), and whatever  
excess amount is paid, will be put into the same kind of long-term investment account for the 
resident. By paying just 3%-16% more in rent, residents can begin accumulating money.  
 Some might wonder why those who won’t invest themselves, would voluntarily agree to 
pay higher rent. There are a few behavioral tricks here. First, this situation acts as a sort of 
commitment device, by which residents, once adjusting to the new status quo of paying slightly 
more rent, will likely feel about the same amount of financial pressure despite technically having 
less to spend. This clamps down on present bias by taking away the daily choice to not save. 
Instead, all residents have to do is make a one-time choice to opt in to the program. Present bias 
is flipped to work in favor of residents here as the loss of the future money that will be put in to 
savings is not felt strongly. To get residents to enroll in this program, PHAs can either make 
joining this kind of a program at some low level the default option, or PHAs can offer residents 
some short-term benefit, potentially a small amount of cash or entry into a raffle to win a 
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computer, in exchange for signing up. Similar to buying a candy bar at the check out line, this is 
an impulse buy, but with significant positive future benefits.  
Intervention 3: Reduce Resident Energy Consumption to Lessen Resident Utility Costs 
 Energy and other utility costs may seem trivial in the grand scheme of all costs residents 
have to pay, but for the poor energy costs take up over 10% of their income.296 This is well 
above the established “affordable energy” threshold which benchmarks affordable energy at no 
higher than 6% of annual income. For households below 50% of the federal poverty level, the 
percentage of income spent on energy is around 35%.297  
Energy usage behavior is another topic that, like savings, has a fairly extensive literature 
in behavioral economics. By modifying bills to include a comparative look at how a certain 
household’s energy usage compares to the whole of that household’s neighborhood, individual 
households can face a social norming effect that studies have shown results in a consistent 
reduction of energy usage by roughly 2% (Schultz et al, 2007).298 The type of chart shown below 
in figure 7.8 with a simple visualization of comparative energy usage shown through a bar graph, 
and emoticon faces showed to be effective. PHAs can work with energy service providers to get 
them to begin using this intervention on bills sent within public housing residences. For the 
average public housing resident living in an apartment, the effect of this interventions would be 
small annually, but if the aggregate energy savings could scaled across all public housing units, 
                                                 
296 Chandler, Adam. " Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of Their Income on Energy." The Atlantic. June 
8, 2016. 
297 Idib.  
298 Schultz, P. Wesley, Jessica M. Nolan, Robert B. Cialdini, Noah J. Goldstein, and Vladas Griskevicius. "The 




potentially tens of millions could be saved per year for residents just by changing a few words 
and pictures on bills.299   
 
Figure 7.8 Example of a Chart Used in “Social-Norming” Energy Conservation Interventions300 
Conclusion: Potential Further Areas for Behavioral Interventions 
The examples provided above should highlight the relative ease with which new 
behavioral interventions can be made. As Chapter 3 discussed, by combining “front-lines” civil 
servants with local policymakers who understand behavioral economics, many more 
interventions could be created. A few problems which might be the focus for future behavioral 
interventions include: increasing social capital in housing projects, creating social ties between 
mixed income and mixed race residents, modifying voucher programs to encourage voucher 
recipients to move to areas of low poverty concentration, stopping gang-related activities in 
public housing, and reducing littering and other public space upkeep problems.  
 
  
                                                 
299 Zillow estimates that the average apartment resident spends at least $200 a month on utilities. By calculating 
yearly costs from that number and multiplying that by the 2% reduction, one gets roughly $50 per household per 
year. This is not much, but for a low-income resident making a median low-income wage, of about $14,000, this is 
almost ½ a percent of their yearly income. If adopted in every public housing unit in America, this is $55 million 
worth of value created out of thin air. Considering this is a minor and nearly costless intervention, it seems worth 
taking. 




CONCLUSION AND TAKEAWAYS 
This paper has discussed problems in public housing in fairly broad terms, without 
limiting to a specific city or type of public housing complex. This is done in lieu of discovering a 
few hyper-specific, immediately implementable behavioral interventions because this paper is 
attempting to look at a broad area of potential interventions in the relatively unexplored area of 
behavioral economics in public housing. Local behaviorally informed policy makers who are 
looking at specific problems in specific cities or regions will want to narrow more to be able to 
discuss the exact problems seen in a specific policy area, before then taking this information and 
looking for behavioral problems.  
For example, perhaps a behaviorally-oriented policymaker wants to look at how the city 
can better collect trash and recyclable products. She may start by finding all the problems that 
exist in the city’s waste management programs, then zoom in on a specific problem. Perhaps in 
this city, waste is not sorted well between recyclable products and normal trash. The policymaker 
can then look at all the problems in depth here. What kind of products are being mis-sorted most 
often? How much is mis-sorted? Is the problem occurring primarily among one type of disposer 
instead of others (i.e., perhaps residential areas are worse at sorting than business and industrial 
disposers)? From these exact observations of the problem, policymakers can then pull out the 
behavioral problems and design interventions. Knowing the exactness of problems like this has 
the potential to generate keener insights and better interventions, but it almost certainly 





The Limits of Behavioral Intervention 
 If the solutions put forward here seem an insufficient response to the magnitude of public 
housing’s problems that is because they are. Are murals, simple forms, and reminder texts going 
to cure poverty and turn around public housing alone? Absolutely not. But that is not the appeal 
of behavioral economics. The appeal is that small modifications to existing practices, meaning 
low costs and often little work, can have outsized effects. Behavioral economics is not meant to 
be a cure to all of society’s ills. When correctly applied, behavioral economics is a clever way to 
go about making an impact in programs on the margin. Save a few exceptional interventions, 
behavioral economics is not a silver bullet. Still, on a benefits per cost basis, behavioral 
economics has been quite successful.  
 Additionally, many of these proposed nudges are either new or being applied to a new 
area. Because of this there is no guarantee that they will prove successful. Behavioral policy 
makers must test these proposed interventions to find if they work in a specific context. Again, 
these intervention proposals are not the end all be all of behavioral economics in public housing. 
These interventions should instead spark further interest in looking at policy problems with a 
behavioral economics lens. If scaled across multiple areas, the small, marginal effects of 
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND SPECIFIC USAGE 
Term Specific Usage in Paper 
Rational 
Relating to the behaviors of “rational” 
economic actors in which individuals make 
prudent, logical decisions to maximize 
personal utility 
Irrational 
Relating to the behaviors not in line with the 
actions of a “rational” economic actor 
Intervention 
Subtle modifications to environments and/or 
processes which try to influence behaviors 
and other outcomes in a certain direction by 
tapping in to behavioral principles 
Behavioral Principle 
Primarily refers to biases and heuristics, but 
also includes other “problems” with human 
behavior such as habits and cognitive 
limitations 
Behavioral Failure 
Failing to act in accordance with a “rational” 
actor model 
Rational-Actor Tool 
The traditionally used motivators in line with 
the rational actor model: incentives, 
information, and regulation. 
Behavioral Tool/ Behavioral Intervention 
(aka: Irrational-Actor Tool) 
Used interchangeably with “intervention” (see 
definition above) 
Behaviorally-informed Policymaker 
Policymakers who have in-depth knowledge 
of both behavioral economics and their 
specific policy realms 
“Front-lines” Civil Servant 
Includes all local government employees who 
interact with the public and observe day-to-
day irrationalities 
Behavioral Economics “Codex” 
An amalgamation of all the research done into 
behavioral principles and interventions which 









APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORKS TO THINK ABOUT CREATING INTERVENTIONS   
As behavioral economics has blossomed in academia, its followership has expanded 
beyond academics to include professions such as marketers, policymakers, politicians, social 
entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and more. Behavioral economics practitioners, a small but 
increasingly influential group, work to determine ways to model human behavior and 
corresponding interventions to change human behavior. With this, a whole host of organizations 
have formed, hoping to leverage behavioral change. These organizations put out a number of 
guiding frameworks for how to create successful interventions. A few of these frameworks will 
be discussed here to give an idea of what factors need to be looked at in designing and 
implementing an intervention. 
 One of the most comprehensive of these frameworks is Mindspace: Influencing 
Behaviour Through Public Policy, put out by the United Kingdom’s Institute for Government.301 
The title, Mindspace, is actually a mnemonic device that represents a “check-list” for behavioral 
interventions when making policies: Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, 
Affect, Commitments, and Ego. Many of these interventions were mentioned in the section 
above. This report is coupled with a framework called the 6Es, built for applying these 
interventions into the real policy world. Four actions (the “Es”) should be the foundation for 
attempting to change behavior: Enable, Encourage, Engage, Exemplify. Additionally, 
Exploration should be done before the implementation of the policy and Evaluation should be 
done after and at iterative times in the future to gauge success. See Mindspace for more.302  
                                                 




The BIT also identified four simple ways to encourage positive behaviors through 
interventions by leveraging the team’s work and academic literature. BIT has compiled these 
methods into the EAST framework, which encourages policymakers to keep their interventions 
Easy, Attractive, Social, and Timely.303 Planners ought to strive for interventions which make it 
easy for individuals to get past the small, seemingly insignificant barriers—friction costs—which 
were discussed earlier. Increasing ease of use or enrollment is one of the easiest ways to increase 
an intervention’s effectiveness. Interventions ought to make the socially desirable also attractive 
by both drawing attention to said thing and making it more appealing. Much as the private sector 
has already been doing through marketing, the public sector can do to make socially desirable 
services attractive. Social factors, a catch all for a number of different social influences, are 
important influences on how people act. Individuals generally conform to the standard set by 
those around them, and social pressures and commitment devices can encourage certain 
behavior. Finally, interventions must be timely in that the responses of individuals can vary 
based on when the individuals are confronted with the intervention. Environment, current stage 
in life, peer influences, and more can make a difference in how responsive people are to 
intervention, so pressing an intervention at the right time can significantly change outcomes, 
especially when dealing with the sometimes marginal effects present in behavioral economics. 
Many of these qualities in the EAST framework have already been evident in earlier discussed 
interventions, but the EAST framework provides a simple reminder of intervention tactics that 
can be widely used. See EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights for more 
information.304  
                                                 




When looking at existing programs, behavioral solutions begin with the recognition of 
the problems in a program that is of interest to the agency or group that is seeking policy 
improvement. From there, policymakers ought to gather data and create a process map of how 
this problem manifests itself within individuals.305 Ideas42, a social enterprise utilizing 
behavioral solutions to solve societal problems, emphasizes that after mapping out a problem, the 
key is to look for “bottlenecks,” or places at which the program is not performing as expected or 
hoped.306 Then, policymakers have to brainstorm what behavioral irrationalities might be causing 
these bottlenecks and/or what behavioral interventions may assist in “unclogging” these critical 
points. Once some ideas are had, the experimentation stage begins. Again, due to the extremely 
empirical nature of behavioral economics, randomized control trials are the best way to approach 
behavioral solutions. For more information see Ideas42’s report BIAS: Behavioral Economics 
and Social Policy.307 
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APPENDIX C: FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (PROVIDED BY THE 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES) 
Federal housing programs provide a range of assistance, including grants or tax credits that 
provide incentives for the production of rental housing, the mortgage interest deduction, and 
rental assistance programs that subsidize rents based on household income. The US Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
administer rental assistance programs that generate income-based rents for residents. By linking 
rents to residents’ income, these programs are fundamentally different from the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, which increases the supply of rent-restricted housing but does not ensure 
affordability at the household level. 
The main federal rental assistance programs are as follows: 
▪ Housing Choice Vouchers. Housing Choice Vouchers, or “Section 8,” provide rental 
assistance to more than 5 million people in 2.2 million households. Vouchers can be used 
in a variety of neighborhoods and offer more locational choice than other rental 
assistance programs. It is targeted for low-income tenants, and 75 percent of voucher 
must go to extremely low–income households. Once a household receives a voucher from 
the local public housing authority (PHA), they typically have 60 days to find a unit that 
meets federal quality standards and whose landlord will accept a voucher. Most 
households pay the higher of 30 percent of income or $50 in rent. 
▪ Public housing. Public housing units are owned and managed by PHAs. Tenants sign 
leases and pay rent directly to PHAs. Approximately 1.1 million public housing units 
exist in the US, and the subsidy stays with the units, not the household. Households must 
have incomes below approximately 80 percent of the area median income (AMI) to 
qualify for public housing, but housing authorities often give preference to households 
that are homeless, over age 55, or have income below 30 percent of the AMI. As with 
vouchers, most households pay the higher of 30 percent of income or $50 in rent. 
▪ Project-Based Section 8. Project-based Section 8, also referred to as project-based rental 
assistance (PBRA), subsidizes housing for more than 1.2 million households. Households 
must have income below approximately 80 percent of the AMI to qualify, but at least 40 
percent of units in each development must go to extremely low–income households. The 
developments are operated by private for-profit or nonprofit owners and subsidized 
through multiyear agreements with HUD. The funding for rental assistance payments is 
subject to annual congressional appropriations. Households pay the higher of 30 percent 
of income or $25 in rent. 
▪ Project-based vouchers. Although most Housing Choice Vouchers are tenant based, 
PHAs may opt to link a portion of their vouchers to specific housing units. Because 
PBRA contracts are not available, PHAs may use project-based vouchers to subsidize 
developments that would otherwise not be financially feasible, such as permanent 
supportive housing. Developments typically have 20-year contracts with the PHA for the 
units. Households renting a unit with a project-based voucher typically pay 30 percent of 
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income for rent and utilities and are subject to the same income limits as any other 
voucher household. 
▪ Section 202 Housing for the Elderly. HUD’s Section 202 program serves very low–
income seniors and disabled persons and provides interest-free capital and operating 
funds to nonprofit organizations that develop and operate housing and related facilities. 
Funding also covers project rental assistance, so that seniors pay only 30 percent of their 
income to rent. 
▪ Section 521 Rural Rental Assistance. Administered by the USDA, Section 521 
supplements tenants’ rent payments so that households’ rent contributions stay under 30 
percent of income for eligible households living in units constructed or renovated through 
the direct loan program Section 515. 
Source: See the Policy Basics series at “Housing,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
accessed December 5, 2017, https://www.cbpp.org/topics/housing. 
 
